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Roth: The Culture of Misdemeanor Courts

THE CULTURE OF MISDEMEANOR COURTS
Jessica A. Roth*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The national conversation about criminal justice reform
increasingly, and rightly, has focused on misdemeanors.1 Just as courts
and scholars increasingly have acknowledged that our criminal justice
system is overwhelmingly one of pleas, not trials,2 so too have they
acknowledged that our system largely is one of misdemeanors, not
felonies.3 At least ten million people were charged with misdemeanors
in state courts in the United States in 2015, whereas a far smaller number
were charged with felonies.4 As one scholar has estimated, the “world of
* Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I am grateful to Ellen
Yaroshefsky for organizing the Judicial Responsibility for Justice in Criminal Courts Conference at
Hofstra Law School in April 2017 which provided the occasion for this Symposium Issue, and to
Peter Joy, Jenny Roberts, and Ellen Yaroshefsky for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
Article. Thanks also to the participants in the 2017 Criminal Justice Ethics Schmooze where this
project was presented as a work in progress, to Judges Andra Sparks, Gayle Williams-Byers, and
Victoria Pratt for sharing generously of their time, and to Rachel Karpoff for excellent research
assistance.
1. There is no single definition of what constitutes a misdemeanor; it is instead whatever the
legislature chooses to classify as a misdemeanor rather than a felony. See Jenny Roberts, Why
Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 277, 290-91 (2011). In general, a misdemeanor is considered less serious than a felony and
is punishable by a fine or a prison term no greater than one year. Id. at 290. Some jurisdictions also
utilize a category of “infractions” or “violations” to describe less serious conduct that is not
categorized as a crime. Id. at 290 n.53.
2. See, e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) (“[C]riminal justice today is for the
most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”); see also Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143
(2012) (explaining the U.S. criminal justice system “is for the most part a system of pleas, not a
system of trials” (quoting Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170)); Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and
Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1148-74 (2001).
3. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1315 (2012)
(“[T]he felony-centric view misapprehends the sprawling reality of the American criminal process.
Most U.S. convictions are misdemeanors.”); Roberts, supra note 1, at 280 (“Contrary to popular
belief . . . the vast majority of criminal cases in the United States are not felonies.”).
4. According to data provided to the National Center for State Courts (“NCSC”) by courts in
thirty-three states and the District of Columbia, approximately 9.5 million people were processed
for misdemeanor cases in 2015, whereas approximately 2.4 million people were processed for
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misdemeanors” is “about four or five times the size of the world
of felonies.”5
The outcomes of these misdemeanor cases are significant.
Sentences for misdemeanor convictions can include imprisonment of up
to one year, probation (violation of which can result in imprisonment)
and fines.6 Persons convicted of misdemeanors frequently are subjected
to severe collateral consequences impeding their ability to pursue
education, employment, and housing opportunities.7 Even if a case is
dismissed, resulting in no conviction, persons charged with
misdemeanors may be jailed pending the resolution of the case,
subjected to court supervision as a condition of dismissal, and burdened
with the increased likelihood of additional future contact with the
criminal justice system, having once been “marked” as one of its
subjects.8 Additionally, what may be a misdemeanor the first time an
offense is charged, such as stealing a loaf of bread, can be charged as a
felonies. See 2015 Criminal Caseloads—Trial Courts, NCSC, http://www.ncsc.org/Sitecore/
Content/Microsites/PopUp/Home/CSP/CSP_Intro (follow “Criminal” hyperlink; then select the data
year for “2015”; then select the chart/table for “Statewide Felony Caseloads and Rates” and
“Statewide Misdem. Caseloads and Rates” hyperlinks) (last visited Nov. 15, 2017). This total does
not include the seventeen states that did not provide distinct misdemeanor and felony caseload data
to the NCSC, such as New York, one of the most populous states. Id. New York separately reported
150,887 adult felony arrests and 328,090 adult misdemeanor arrests for 2016. Adult Arrests 20072016, N.Y. ST. DIVISION OF CRIM. JUST. SERV. (Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/
crimnet/ojsa/arrests/Allcounties.pdf.
5. Natapoff, supra note 3, at 1320-21. Natapoff’s estimate is consistent with the data
collected by the NCSC for 2015. See 2015 Criminal Caseloads—Trial Courts, supra note 4; see
also NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN OVERVIEW OF
2015 STATE COURT CASELOADS 13 (2016) (reporting that of the thirty states reporting data by case
type, roughly eighty percent of the courts’ criminal docket were misdemeanor cases compared to
approximately twenty percent for felonies).
6. See Roberts, supra note 1, at 290-91, 292 n.66, 297 (surveying penalties authorized for
misdemeanors in various states). Although one year of imprisonment is the maximum in most
states, at least one state authorizes up to ten years’ imprisonment for some misdemeanors. Id. at
290-91.
7. See, e.g., id. at 297-300 (discussing formal and informal collateral consequences
of misdemeanor convictions); see also Natapoff, supra note 3, at 1325 (same); National Inventory
of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, JUST. CTR.,
https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org (last visited Nov. 15, 2017) (follow the “go” hyperlink; then select
a specific “jurisdiction” hyperlink) (providing a searchable database of collateral consequences
under federal law and in each state with triggering offenses).
8. See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1125-26 (2008)
(discussing various reasons why those who are already known to law enforcement actors are more
likely to be stopped or arrested in the future than those who are not); Issa Kohler-Hausmann,
Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 643-44 (2014) (arguing that
“marking” is “public credentialing” which “classifies subjects based on the statuses they have
achieved through their contact with the police and courts,” which can be used within the criminal
justice system to “signify what level of response is warranted and what other sorts of testing or
punishments will be imposed in the context of later encounters”); see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER,
THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 94-95 (2010).
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felony the second time if the accused has the first misdemeanor
conviction.9 The presence of a misdemeanor conviction on a person’s
record also may impact a prosecutor’s exercise of charging or plea
bargaining discretion in a future case, a judge’s exercise of sentencing
discretion, or a defendant’s eligibility for diversionary programs.10
The lower-level state courts where misdemeanors are adjudicated
(collectively what this Article refers to as “misdemeanor courts”)11 also
are where most people have their first contact with our judicial
institutions and therefore form their critical first impressions of them.12
If courts are accessible, if staff and judges treat those who enter with
dignity and convey that the courts are there to serve the community, then
that is the message heard by those audiences. If courts are inhospitable,
if they treat those who use them as outsiders whose interests do not
matter, then that is the message that will be absorbed. Those who
interact with our misdemeanor courts will carry these impressions
forward, including to future contact with other courts. Similarly, the
judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers who begin their careers in
misdemeanor courts will carry forward to their future endeavors the
habits and work orientation developed during their training. Thus, what
happens in misdemeanor courts is important in and of itself, due
9. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-1 (2012). In other jurisdictions, similar crimes can
be charged as felonies if the accused has two prior misdemeanor convictions for the offense. See,
e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 565.076 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.05 (West 2011).
10. See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 8, at 681 (describing the statistical increase of
convictions against individuals with prior misdemeanor convictions); id. at 661 (describing how
prior misdemeanor convictions can alter a judge’s discretion with respect to sentence length
and severity); Misdemeanor Diversion Information, JAY COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S OFF.,
https://jaycountyprosecutor.com/Misdemeanor_Diversion.php (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
11. As discussed further below, the courts that handle the bulk of misdemeanor cases in the
United States have diverse names, jurisdictions, and organizational structures. See generally RON
MALEGA & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION, 2011
(2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sco11.pdf (discussing how the organization structure
of the nation’s trial and appellate courts have changed modestly from 1980 to 2011). For example,
some are known as Municipal Courts, Town, Village, or City Courts, Criminal Courts, or
Magistrate’s Courts. See id. at 2. In addition to authority to adjudicate misdemeanors and lesser
offenses like traffic violations, many also have authority to issue warrants and handle some
civil matters. See, e.g., Types of Court Cases: Misdemeanor Matters, MICH. COURTS,
http://courts.mi.gov/self-help/center/casetype/pages/misdemeanor.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
Some courts also have jurisdiction over early-stage proceedings in felony cases, such as first
appearances and bail determinations. See id. at 2; see also NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra
note 5, at 12 (discussing the differences among states in processing felonies).
12. See PETER F. NARDULLI ET AL., THE TENOR OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL COURTS AND THE
GUILTY PLEA PROCESS 14 (1988) (noting that the nation’s lowest state courts handle “the bulk of
the nation’s judicial work”); Ethan J. Lieb, Local Judges and Local Government, 18 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 707, 734-35 (2015) (“Local courts are the face of the law to millions who will
never know about federal Supreme Court opinions, about the Appellate Division at the state
level . . . . So making sure that these courts project professionalism and dignity is essential.”).
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to the courts’ unique position as the “front porch” of our criminal
justice system.13
Unfortunately, the practices of many misdemeanor courts leave
much to be desired. There are courts where innocent people are
convicted of crimes they did not commit;14 where defendants plead
guilty without understanding important consequences of their conviction
or without the benefit of counsel;15 and where defendants are detained
because they cannot afford bail.16 In some courts, cases are routinely and
repeatedly adjourned needlessly, prolonging the period of uncertainty for
the accused, victims, and the affected community.17 In some courts,
family and community members are unable to attend and understand
proceedings because of unreliable court calendars or courtroom practices

13. The image of the misdemeanor court as the “front porch” of the criminal justice system
was suggested by Judge Andra Sparks, Presiding Judge of the Birmingham, Alabama Municipal
Court, a participant in the 2017 Judicial Responsibility for Justice in Criminal Courts Conference,
whose innovations are highlighted in Part III.
14. Scholars have increasingly focused on the “innocence problem” in misdemeanor courts.
See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, What We Think, What We Know and What We Think We Know About
False Convictions, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 753, 754, 767, 776-77 (2017) (suggesting that
“thousands . . . of innocent defendants a year plead guilty to misdemeanors and low-level felonies in
order to avoid prolonged pretrial detention”); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 11 ANN. REV. L.
& SOC. SCI. 255, 256 (2015) (“[T]he misdemeanor system has a massive wrongful conviction
problem that dwarfs the felony innocence docket” which stems from the “slapdash and coercive
nature of the plea bargaining process.”); Roberts, supra note 1, at 285-86 (“[T]he potential for
wrongful convictions and the troubling phenomenon of innocent people pleading guilty is great in
low-level cases.”).
15. See, e.g., ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS,
MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR
COURTS 14-15 (2009) (discussing absence of counsel in misdemeanor cases); Robert C.
Boruchowitz, Fifty Years After Gideon: It Is Long Past Time to Provide Lawyers for Misdemeanor
Defendants Who Cannot Afford to Hire Their Own, 11 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 891, 896-904
(2013) (describing misdemeanor guilty pleas taken without defense counsel in a variety of
jurisdictions); Roberts, supra note 1, at 306-13 (discussing practices in high-volume misdemeanor
courts); see also ALISA SMITH & SEAN MADDAN, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS,
THREE MINUTE JUSTICE: HASTE AND WASTE IN FLORIDA’S MISDEMEANOR COURTS 14-15 (2011)
(describing how in Florida misdemeanor court, most pleas lasted fewer than three minutes and
defendants rarely were informed of their rights).
16. See, e.g., BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 15, at 36; Roberts, supra note 1, at 308; Nick Pinto,
The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 16, 2015, at 38, 41-42; Stuart Rabner, Opinion, Chief
Justice: Bail Reform Puts N.J. at the Forefront of Fairness, N.J. OPINION (Jan. 9, 2017),
http://www.nj.com/opinion/index.ssf/2017/01/nj_chief_justice_bail_reform_puts_nj_at_the_forefr.
html (citing a 2012 study showing that one in eight people in New Jersey’s county jails were there
because they could not afford bail of $2500 or less).
17. See Ian Weinstein, The Adjudication of Minor Offenses in New York City, 31 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1157, 1171-72 (2004) (describing delays in adjudication of misdemeanor cases in New
York City); William Glaberson, Even for Minor Crimes in Bronx, No Guarantee of Getting a Trial,
N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2013, at A1; Pinto, supra note 16, at 43 (discussing delays and the dangers that
pre-trial detention poses, including to family members, housing, and work).
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that effectively shut them out.18 Many of these same problems are
present in felony courts, but they are particularly salient in misdemeanor
courts, where the volume is greater and resources scarcer, where defense
counsel often is unavailable,19 and where procedures historically have
been less formal20—for example, with some courts presided over by
judges who are not lawyers.21
And yet there also are some misdemeanor courts where things are
done differently. For example, there are courts where defendants are
reliably appointed counsel at the first appearance,22 and where cash bail
is rarely required.23 There are courts that emphasize customer service,
18. See, e.g., STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 34-40 (2012)
(discussing the exclusion of “outsiders” from the process of criminal justice); Jocelyn Simonson,
The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2173, 2190-94 (2014)
(discussing the various ways family and community members are excluded from observing
misdemeanor proceedings); see also CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, TO BE FAIR: CONVERSATIONS
ABOUT PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 22 (Emily LaGratta ed. 2017), http://www.courtinnovation.org/
sites/default/files/documents/To_Be_Fair.pdf (discussing interview with Kevin Burke, District
Judge, Hennipin County, Minnesota, noting that, in many courts, if a person looks lost the court
security guard will kick them out, whereas at a Neiman Marcus store, somebody would approach
them and offer help).
19. There is no federal constitutional right to counsel in misdemeanor cases, unless the
resulting sentence includes a term of imprisonment, either imposed or suspended. See Alabama v.
Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 657, 662 (2002) (holding that a suspended sentence following uncounseled
conviction violated Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37
(1972) (holding that a sentence of imprisonment for any crime violated Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, absent valid waiver of that right). This ex post approach to whether a defendant has a right
to counsel to defend against a misdemeanor charge has enabled some misdemeanor courts to avoid
appointing counsel by, for example, eliciting a commitment from the prosecutor that no prison
sentence will be sought. See Roberts, supra note 1, at 311. Several states guarantee a right to
counsel that goes beyond this federal constitutional minimum. See John D. King, Beyond “Life and
Liberty”: The Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 11-15 (2013) (discussing
torturous case law on right to counsel in misdemeanor cases); Roberts, supra note 1, at 310-13
(same).
20. See, e.g., Natapoff, supra note 3, at 1320, 1348 (discussing the “off the record” nature of
many misdemeanor proceedings); Eve Brensike Primus, Our Broken Misdemeanor Justice System:
Its Problems and Some Potential Solutions, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 80, 86 & n.23 (2012)
(noting that the “current practice in many jurisdictions” is not to keep verbatim transcripts of
misdemeanor court proceedings).
21. See, e.g., MALEGA & COHEN, supra note 11, at 5 (noting that a law degree or other type of
legal qualification was required for only fifty-nine percent of judgeships in limited jurisdiction
courts); William Glaberson, Delivering Small-Town Justice, with a Mix of Trial and Error, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2006, at A1; William Glaberson, How a Reviled Court System Has Outlasted Many
Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2006, at A1, B8; William Glaberson, In Tiny Courts of New York,
Abuses of Law and Power, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2006, at A1.
22. See, e.g., Alissa Politz Worden et al., Court Reform: Why Simple Solutions Might Not
Fail? A Case Study of Implementation of Counsel at First Appearance, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521,
529-33, 537-39 (2017) (describing improvements in appointment of counsel at first appearance in
New York courts).
23. See, e.g., Lisa W. Foderaro, Debating Mercy vs. Risk as New Jersey Mostly Discards
Cash Bail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2017, at A1 (describing New Jersey’s ambitious overhaul of its bail
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accessibility, and procedural justice.24 Although they are not without
their critics,25 there are now thousands of “problem-solving” courts
around the country dedicated to finding alternatives to criminal
conviction and incarceration for lower-level offenses.26 These courts
may be imperfect, but they certainly represent an innovation over
the traditional model that preceded them as the sole option in
many jurisdictions.

system to practically eliminate cash bail, effective state-wide as of January 1, 2017); Ann E.
Marimow, When It Comes to Pretrial Release, Few Other Jurisdictions Do It D.C.’s Way,
WASH. POST (July 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/when-it-comesto-pretrial-release-few-other-jurisdictions-do-it-dcs-way/2016/07/04/8eb52134-e7d3-11e5-b0fd073d5930a7b7_story.html?utm_term=.45e516788a09 (recounting how the District of Columbia’s
busiest courthouse releases approximately ninety percent of those who have been arrested and held
overnight).
24. Marimow, supra note 23. The concept of procedural justice is most closely associated
with Tom Tyler, who has argued that people’s perception of how they are treated by the legal
system informs their perception of the legitimacy of that system and their willingness to obey its
commands. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 125-30 (2006); Tom R. Tyler,
Procedural Justice and the Courts, 44 CT. REV. 26, 26 (2007); see also Brian J. Ostrom et al., The
High Performance Court Framework, in FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 2010, at 140, 142
(Carol R. Flango et al. eds., 2011) (“Perceptions that procedures are fair and understandable
influence a host of outcome variables, including satisfaction with the process, respect for the court,
and willingness to comply with court rulings and orders—even if individuals do not like the
outcome.”).
25. For a thorough critique of problem-solving courts, see, for example, Steven Zeidman,
Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the Prosecution, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 33644 (2005) (arguing that problem-solving courts do not sufficiently safeguard defendants’ due
process rights or deter overzealous law enforcement tactics); and see also Timothy Casey, When
Good Intentions Are Not Enough: Problem-Solving Courts and the Impending Crisis of Legitimacy,
57 SMU L. REV. 1459, 1497-98 (2004) (discussing how problem-solving courts deteriorate the
adversarial process and change the role of defense counsel); Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction:
Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1551-61
(2004) (discussing “net widening” effect of drug courts); and Mae C. Quinn, “Post-Ferguson”
Social Engineering: Problem-Solving Justice or Just Posturing, 59 HOW. L.J. 739, 759-64 (2015)
(arguing that problem-solving courts do nothing to address the numerous local ordinances that
should not be on the books or enforced, and pointing out the conflicts of interest inherent in such
courts, including vis-à-vis service providers who benefit from court-ordered treatment).
26. See, e.g., GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR PROBLEMSOLVING JUSTICE 31-33 (2005) (discussing history and evolution of “problem-solving courts” and
estimating as of 2005 that there were at least 2000 such courts throughout the United States). The
authors define a problem-solving court as one “working to ensure . . . the process fits the problem,”
in which “judges and attorneys [] think of themselves as problem-solvers rather than as simply case
processors.” Id. at 5. More recent estimates put the number of problem-solving courts at
approximately 3000. See, e.g., Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils
of a Shifting Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1605, 1610-11 (2012) (noting the proliferation of
specialized state courts since the early 1990s reaching approximately 3000 by 2010); see also
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF PROBLEM SOLVING COURTS,
2012 (revised Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpsc12.pdf (“In 2012,
the . . . Census of Problem-Solving Courts counted 3,052 problem-solving courts in the United
States . . . .”).
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What separates one type of court from the other? Surely, resources
and the local jurisdiction’s substantive laws are important factors. But,
extensive literature on organizational theory suggests that organizational
“culture” is a major piece of the puzzle as well.27 Drawing on diverse
fields including anthropology, sociology, and psychology,28 academics
of various backgrounds and management experts have coalesced around
the notion that culture plays a key role in how public and private
organizations perform.29 As defined by James Q. Wilson, organizational
culture is “a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks
of and human relationships within an organization. Culture is to an
organization what personality is to an individual.”30
Organizational culture theory thus explains (at least in part) why
courts do things so differently from one another, and why it can be so
difficult to transform one court so that it behaves like another. According
to organizational culture theory, a reformer may have a worthy idea for
how to change some aspect of an organization’s work, but if that change
is incompatible with the organizational culture, the idea is unlikely to
achieve its desired goal or to endure.31 In short, organizational culture
can be a significant barrier to meaningful change and sometimes must be
modified before other reforms, even those mandated by law, can
succeed.32 But changing culture is difficult. Culture takes time to

27. See NARDULLI ET AL., supra note 12, at 14 (“While the law acts as a constraint upon what
[lower courts] can do, it is only one of many constraints. Often it is not the most important . . . .”).
28. See EDGAR H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP, at ix (4th ed. 2010)
[hereinafter SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE] (describing the various disciplines that have been
brought to bear on the emerging field of “organizational culture” studies).
29. See, e.g., KIM S. CAMERON & ROBERT E. QUINN, DIAGNOSING AND CHANGING
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 5 (3d ed. 2011) (arguing that the “major distinguishing feature” of
many of the most successful companies “is their organizational culture”); JOHN P. KOTTER & JAMES
L. HESKETT, CORPORATE CULTURE AND PERFORMANCE 8-9 (1992); EDGAR H. SCHEIN, THE
CORPORATE CULTURE SURVIVAL GUIDE 3-7 (1999); SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, supra
note 28, at 13-14. Although some scholars have viewed private and public institutions as so unalike
that research on the former is irrelevant to the latter, more scholars have taken a contrary view,
acknowledging the different missions and context of the two types but still finding commonalities
that make scholarship on private institutions useful in thinking about the problems facing public
institutions. See, e.g., BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., TRIAL COURTS AS ORGANIZATIONS 25-26 (2007)
(quoting Wallace Sayre’s famous claim that “public and private organizations are ‘fundamentally
alike in all unimportant respects’”).
30. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY
DO IT 91 (1989).
31. See CAMERON & QUINN, supra note 29, at 163 (“Most changes attempted in
organizations . . . do not succeed because of cultural incompatibility.”).
32. See id. (“Culture change therefore is a crucial requirement for success in many
organizations.”).
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develop; once it is established, “like human culture generally, it is
passed on from one generation to the next. It changes slowly, if at all.”33
The central question of this Article is how one shapes
organizational culture—in particular, the culture of a misdemeanor
court—if culture is getting in the way of desired reforms. The emphasis
thus is not on which specific goals or policies courts should pursue, but
instead on how reformers can ensure that culture does not impede the
progress of whatever goals they select—or at least how they can
minimize its drag. Part II introduces the concept of organizational
culture in greater detail, including its application to courts.34 After
discussing briefly how culture is formed in new organizations, it turns to
the challenge of modifying culture in existing institutions and identifies
certain factors that appear to be key to success.35 Part III then discusses
features of misdemeanor courts that make them particularly challenging
places to pursue cultural change.36 Finally, Part IV describes the
experiences of selected misdemeanor courts where innovative judges are
championing significant changes to the conventional way of doing
things.37 These courts are highlighted as “stories of innovation.”38
Because these innovations are relatively recent, it is difficult to draw any
conclusions about their long-term staying power and whether in fact they
are altering the culture of their courts. Nevertheless, these stories lend
credence to the significance of the factors identified in Part II, many of
which are present in these innovative courts.39 Their experiences also
attest to the salience of the factors identified in Part II, many of which
can be seen at work as well.40

33. WILSON, supra note 30, at 91; see CAMERON & QUINN, supra note 29, at 20; KOTTER &
HESKETT, supra note 29, at 78-79; SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, supra note 28, at 16;
Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Psychology Then and Now: Some Observations, ANN. REV.
ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. AND ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV., Jan. 22, 2015, at 1, 9 (“[C]ultures as a
whole don’t change; they evolve slowly as bits and pieces of them are changed by systematic
change interventions.”).
34. See infra Part II.A.
35. See infra Part II.B.
36. See infra Part III.
37. See infra Part IV.
38. See infra p. 238.
39. See infra Parts II.B, IV.
40. See infra Parts II.B, IV.
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DEFINING AND SHAPING ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
A. The Concept of Organizational Culture

As noted above, an organization’s culture has been likened to an
individual’s personality.41 This personality, however, can be described at
various levels. On the most superficial level, there is observable
behavior—for example, the routines and practices that would be most
immediately apparent to an outsider.42 These are the most easily changed
aspects of the organizational culture.43 However, this first level is often
linked to and reinforces a deeper aspect of the organization’s
personality, which includes the underlying values that “tend to persist
over time even when group membership changes.”44 These assumptions
can be so deeply engrained as to be practically invisible even to group
members.45 Nevertheless, they often severely constrain what behavior
and goals seem possible.46 Organizations also sometimes have an
intermediate level of culture, consisting of “espoused beliefs.”47 The
larger and more complex an organization is, the more likely it is to have
subcultures within it—for example, in units responsible for discrete
tasks,48 or among workers of shared professional backgrounds.49 These
units have much in common with the overall organization, but also hold
additional assumptions “usually reflecting their functional tasks, the
occupations of their members, or their unique experiences.”50

41. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
42. See SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, supra note 28, at 23; see also KOTTER &
HESKETT, supra note 29, at 4 (discussing examples of this kind of observable behavior would
include not only specific practices, but being “very friendly” or “hard-workers”).
43. KOTTER & HESKETT, supra note 29, at 4.
44. Id.
45. See SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, supra note 28, at 28.
46. Id. (noting these shared assumptions can make “behavior based on any other premise
inconceivable”).
47. Id. at 23-24, 320-21 (explaining that artifacts describe “what is going on” in an
organization; espoused values describe the “why” for those behaviors—for example, the espoused
value of having a non-hierarchical organization may explain the artifact of there being few status
symbols like corner offices).
48. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 30, at 93; see also SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE,
supra note 28, at 55 (discussing emergence of sub-cultures that “most often form around the
functional units of the organization”).
49. See SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, supra note 28, at 55 (“Much of what goes on
inside an organization that has existed for some time can best be understood as a set of interactions
of subcultures operating within the larger context of the organizational culture.”); Schein, supra
note 33, at 7.
50. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, supra note 28, at 55.
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For several decades, scholars have observed that courts, like other
institutions, have engrained cultures and subcultures. For example,
writing in 1978, Thomas Church and several collaborators used the term
“local legal culture” to describe the “established expectations, practices
and informal rules of behavior” of different courthouses.51 In the 1980s
and 1990s, Eisenstein, Fleming, and Nardulli published a series of
studies of courts, in which they used the terms “work orientations” and
“rationalizing principles” to denote a similar concept to court culture.52
Both sets of scholars agreed that these aspects of the courts they studied
played a significant role in how the courts performed on measures like
speed of case disposition that could not be explained by other factors
including courthouse size or docket, resources, or internal structure.53
Nardulli et al. also coined the term “court community,” to describe the
constellation of actors regularly working together in a court—some
employed by the court but others not, such as prosecutors and defense
lawyers—who collectively created its culture.54 In his seminal study of
criminal courts, first published in 1983, Malcolm Feeley also warned
against well-intentioned reform efforts that failed to recognize that
“[i]nformal practices and procedures [within a court] are not
idiosyncratic accidents but are usually the result of perceived
necessities,” and encouraged reformers to view court practices not in
isolation, but in their “historical and functional context.”55
More recently, Brian Ostrom, Roger Hanson, and various
collaborators focused on the study of court culture, which they define as
“the beliefs and behaviors shaping ‘the way things get done’ by the
individuals—judges, managers, and staff members” who work in
the courthouse.56 As they summarized the importance of culture to
reform efforts:
Many court reform efforts are based on the belief that any policy can
be put in place in any court at any time. In reality, court practices are
slow to change. They are conditioned on the past and reflect

51. THOMAS CHURCH, JR. ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE
PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN COURTS 54 (1978), https://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/
collection/ctadmin/id/41/rec/1.
52. NARDULLI ET AL., supra note 12, at 126. See generally JAMES EISENSTEIN ET AL., THE
CONTOURS OF JUSTICE: COMMUNITIES AND THEIR COURTS (1988); ROY B. FLEMMING ET AL., THE
CRAFT OF JUSTICE: POLITICS AND WORK IN CRIMINAL COURT COMMUNITIES (1992).
53. See CHURCH, supra note 51, at 54; NARDULLI ET AL., supra note 12, at 126.
54. FLEMMING ET AL., supra note 52, at 123-24; NARDULLI ET AL., supra note 12, at 126.
55. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL, at xiii
(1983).
56. Brian J. Ostrom & Roger A. Hanson, Understanding Court Culture Is Key to Successful
Court Reform, in FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 2010, at 55 (Carol F. Flango et al. eds., 2010).
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the influence of informal norms and well-established ways of
doing business.57

Ostrom and Hanson warn that when reformers fail to account for
the established culture of a court, they may encounter opposition ranging
from a “lack of engagement” to not-subtle resistance.58
B. Shaping Organizational Culture
In new organizations, the founding leadership usually plays an outsized role in determining the organizational culture.59 The first leaders
select the organization’s structure, mission, and values, and make key
hiring decisions.60 Eventually from these initial decisions flow day-today routines and practices that help implement the founders’ vision.61
Even once the leadership has turned over, the founders’ legacy often
remains in the norms and assumptions about the organization’s mission
and possibilities that constitute the deeper level of the organization’s
culture, and in the observable behavior and policies that are the
“artifacts” of the organization’s initial choices.62 Absent deliberate
efforts at change, the organization’s culture at both levels often persists
as “the result of the embedding of what a founder or leader has imposed
on a group that has worked out.”63
Once an organization and its culture are well-established,
modifying that culture, especially at the deeper level, can be quite
difficult.64 However, organizational theorists have identified several
factors that are associated with successful cultural change. The first and
most important factor is the presence of strong leaders who voice the
“need for change” and point the institution in a new direction.65 As John
Kotter and James Heskett have observed, the leadership required “is

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, supra note 28, at 274 (“[During the] founding
and early growth of a new organization—the main cultural thrust comes from the founders and their
assumptions.”).
60. See id. at 274, 280.
61. See id. at 252, 275.
62. See id. at 282.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 274, 276, 281-83 (discussing the challenges to cultural change at different stages
of an organization); see also KOTTER & HESKETT, supra note 29, at 4.
65. KOTTER & HESKETT, supra note 29, at 144-46; see also Paul J. De Muniz, Overturning
Precedent: The Case for Judicial Activism in Reengineering State Courts, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1819 (2012) (“[O]ne factor essential to successful organization-wide reengineering is the presence of a
dynamic leadership espousing a dynamic vision.” (citing Michael Hammer, Reengineering Work:
Don’t Automate, Obliterate, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 1990, at 104, 112)).
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something quite different from even excellent management.”66 Schein
similarly has emphasized this “unique function of leadership that
distinguishes it from management and administration.”67 A team can
exercise the leadership function by distributing it among several
individuals.68 It can come from within the organization, or be brought in
from the outside, but it must have both sufficient objectivity to be able to
see clearly what needs to be changed and sufficient understanding of the
organization’s existing culture to appreciate the obstacles and the best
way forward.69
The traits required of those exercising leadership depend on the
tasks to be performed and the surrounding circumstances. Although
there is no single set of “personal characteristics [that] distinguish a
leader from the rest of humanity,” research supports three types as being
particularly likely to be effective leaders: (1) those who derive their
influence from “their total command of a subject matter and
demonstrated competence”; (2) those who are particularly supportive of
subordinates, helping them to learn and treating them as human beings;
and (3) those who exude charisma—“a level of confidence and
emotional potency that gives . . . (subordinates) a blind confidence to
agree and go along with whatever the leader wants.”70 In addition to
defining “the values or norms” through which the organization
“develop[s] a sense of identity,” the leadership also has a “unique
obligation to manage the relationship between a system and its
environment.”71 Thus, the leadership function “must be fulfilled by those
members [of the organization] who are in contact with the organizationenvironment boundary.”72
66. KOTTER & HESKETT, supra note 29, at 12.
67. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, supra note 28, at 195; see also OSTROM ET AL.,
supra note 29, at 139 (“Success in trial court management requires purposeful and deliberative
leadership rather than forceful tactics or combative reactions.”); Schein, supra note 33, at 9
(suggesting leaders must define “values and norms, turning these into shared rules for behavior,”
which is “de facto creating and managing culture”).
68. Schein, supra note 33, at 8.
69. See SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, supra note 28, at 376 (suggesting leaders
capable of managing cultural change within mature organizations must have “objectivity” and “be
able to perceive and think about ways of doing things different from what the current assumptions
imply” but also must “diagnose accurately what the culture of the organization is, which elements
are well adapted, which elements are problematic for future adaption, and how to change that which
needs changing”); see also FEELEY, supra note 55, at 197 (“While outsiders may be able to
transcend the limited perspectives and incentives of those who work daily in the criminal courts,
their remoteness from the courts prevents them from understanding the byzantine realities of the
criminal justice process, and, as a result, their efforts are often misdirected.”).
70. Schein, supra note 33, at 8.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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Second, this requisite leadership must be of sufficient duration to
develop a plan and see it through until the desired changes become
embedded. Successful cultural change requires multiple steps—
including “unfreezing” or destabilizing old assumptions about the way
things are done, learning new ways of doing them, and then
“refreezing,” or internalizing the new ways.73 It takes time to determine
the best way forward, and to educate those within the organization about
the problems with the old ways of proceeding and the superiority of the
new ways.74 If those within the organization do not eventually
internalize the rationale for the new behavior, they will revert to old
behaviors when the leadership changes.75
Third, the agency of employees and other stakeholders in the
organization should be respected to the extent possible. When those
actors do not feel that their concerns have been heard, they can resort to
various measures—including “avoidance, evasion, and delay”—to avoid
change.76 But if they are made to feel part of the process, they are more
likely to cooperate.77 In the development stage, the leadership ideally
should solicit feedback from employees and other stakeholders before
formulating a plan of action.78 As those charged with implementing the
institution’s mission, or most affected by it, these individuals may have
valuable ideas to contribute to the reform process.79 Even if their ideas
ultimately do not shape the organization’s agenda, at a minimum,
reformers should understand the contrary points of view and how
structural incentives currently operate.80 Where minds cannot be
changed initially, reformers must “alter the incentives of those whose
behavior” must be changed to accomplish the desired result.81 Moreover,
73. See SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, supra note 28, at 300-11.
74. See id. at 301.
75. See id. at 310. As one example of this phenomenon, Hennepin County, Minnesota, was
once considered a national model of procedural justice, under the leadership of Judge Kevin Burke.
But when Judge Burke reached the end of his term-limited tenure as Chief Judge in 2004 and many
of the judges he trained left the bench, the practices he advocated fell out of use in many
courtrooms. See Tina Rosenberg, The Simple Idea that Could Transform U.S. Criminal Justice,
GUARDIAN (June 23, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/23/procedural-justicetransform-us-criminal-courts.
76. FEELEY, supra note 55, at 36.
77. See id. at 196-97.
78. See SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, supra note 28, at 279; SAMHSA, U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., IMPROVING CULTURAL COMPETENCE 84 (2014),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK248428.
79. See WILSON, supra note 30, at 229 (“[E]xecutives lack the detailed and specialized
knowledge possessed by operators and lower-level managers . . . .”).
80. FEELEY, supra note 55, at 198-99.
81. Id.; see also OSTROM ET AL., supra note 29, at 139 (noting the importance of steps to
“promote involvement and minimize resistance, to clarify what the new cultural emphases will be,
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giving employees agency in the details of implementation—even if they
initially disagree with the goal—still is worthwhile. As Schein has
observed, even where the ultimate object is “nonnegotiable,” the method
of getting there can be “highly individualized.”82
Fourth, reform should be pursued through incremental measures
that are problem-focused and attuned to local context.83 Rarely will
every aspect of an organization’s culture stand in the way of a desired
policy goal; there may in fact be aspects of the culture that will aid the
desired changes.84 The key is to identify which if any cultural
assumptions and artifacts are hindering the desired change, and focus on
those.85 Symbols can be a powerful tool in pursuing such incremental
reform. They cannot define culture or single-handedly change it, but
they can “reinforce” cultural assumptions and be enlisted as part
of an effort to reshape them.86 Change at the deeper level of an
organization’s culture flows from concrete, strategic changes at the more
superficial levels.87

and to establish a plan of action to initiate and encourage momentum for change” to an
“organizational culture change effort”).
82. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, supra note 28, at 306; see also Gordon M. Griller,
Governing Loosely Coupled Courts in Times of Economic Stress, in FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE
COURTS 2010, at 48, 52 (Carol F. Flango et al. eds., 2010) (discussing how empowering others by
giving them “responsibility for outcomes where they can design a final product or task with only
general direction” is key to building trust within an organization and fulfilling goals initiated at the
top).
83. See Schein, supra note 33, at 9 (“[I]nterventions work only when the culture changes are
clearly tied to the fixing of some organizational problems linked to performance.”).
84. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE supra note 28, at 312.
85. See FEELEY, supra note 55, at 187-88; WILSON, supra note 30, at 375 (“[P]ublic
management is not an arena in which to find Big Answers; it is a world of settled institutions
designed to allow imperfect people to use flawed procedures to cope with insoluble problems.”);
Griller, supra note 82, at 50 (“People are comfortable with what they know and understand, and
uncomfortable with changes that pull them too fast and too far from the familiar.”); see also
FEELEY, supra note 55, at 194-95 (suggesting that reformers eschew formalism in favor of a
“pragmatist” view, insisting that “principles be examined only in relation to concrete settings,” and
embracing an “experimental approach to change, tentatively moving away from what is inadequate
in the hope of making incremental improvement”).
86. See SCHEIN, supra note 28, at 138; see also FEELEY, supra note 55, at 222-23 (observing
that if the courtroom is in disrepair, the language of the courts is “incomprehensible,” and officials
are “uncommunicative,” then the “appearance of injustice” is “almost ensure[d]”). Recently, New
York’s Chief Judge sought to leverage the power of symbols when she focused on the repair of a
prominent clock in the Manhattan courthouse, which had been broken for decades, as part of the
“Excellence” Initiative for the courts. See James C. McKinley Jr., Top Judge Goes Where Flaws Are
Acute to Address State of Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2017, at A20.
87. See DAVID C. STEELMAN & GORDON M. GRILLER, NAT’L. CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
RETHINKING FELONY CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT TO CREATE A CULTURE OF HIGH PERFORMANCE
37 (2013), http://nacmconference.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/BJA-Rethinking-Felony-CFMDraft-Nov-2013.pdf (“Cultural change comes last, not first.”).
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Fifth, the leadership must ensure that there is both “performance
measurement” (for example, collection of relevant data) and
“performance management.”88 The former evaluates how the
organization is faring in meeting predetermined goals.89 The latter “adds
value to measurement results” by modifying the organization’s practices
and holding accountable those who are “slowing the achievement of
desired objectives.”90 The leadership can use the data collected to
communicate to internal and external actors the merits of recent
adjustments to its practices in helping the organization meet its stated
goals91—which can be critical to winning over those constituencies (if
they were not already convinced) and securing the longevity of the
reform.92 If the data show that some internal actors persist in behaviors
that are inconsistent with the desired reform, then either the reform plan
must be adjusted or eventually those actors must be dismissed.93
III.

THE CHALLENGE OF SHAPING MISDEMEANOR COURT CULTURE

Once the key factors in shaping organizational culture are
identified, it becomes clear why courts are such a challenging
environment in which to pursue cultural change. Although some
“problem-solving” courts effectively have been created as fresh standalone institutions,94 more often—and to bring such efforts to scale—

88. Roger A. Hanson & Brian J. Ostrom, Introduction: Achieving Better Court Management
Through Better Data, 15 J. APPL. PRAC. & PROCESS 19, 23 (2014).
89. Id.
90. BRIAN J. OSTROM & ROGER A. HANSON, NAT’L. CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, ACHIEVING
HIGH PERFORMANCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR COURTS 51 (2010), http://cdm16501.contentdm.
oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/ctadmin/id/1874. As one example of the importance of accountability,
researchers in New York found that the willingness of a county’s supervising judge to invoke the
threat of disciplinary sanctions against non-compliant judges was critical to implementation of the
State’s initiative to improve appointment of counsel at first appearances. See Worden et al., supra
note 22, at 544.
91. See STEELMAN & GRILLER, supra note 87, at 37 (noting the importance to cultural change
of its proponent being able “to prove that the new way is superior to the old” and that this success
“must be visible and well communicated”).
92. FEELEY, supra note 55, at 37 (noting that “[u]nless a program is intended to be temporary
or a single-shot effort, sooner or later” the organization must commit the funding and physical base
of operations to keep it going on a regular basis); see also SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
supra note 28, at 312 (“A leader can impose new ways of doing things, can articulate new goals and
means, and can change reward and control systems, but none of those changes will produce culture
change unless the new ways of doing things actually works better.”).
93. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, supra note 28, at 311-12.
94. See, e.g., BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 26, at 61-66, 76-79 (describing evolution of
Midtown Community Court in Manhattan and Red Hook Community Court).
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reformers must work within courts that are mature institutions with
engrained cultures and subcultures.95
Establishing the requisite leadership to initiate and implement
reform within courts is one of the greatest challenges.96 Although the
idea for reform can start with policy advocates on the outside, or higher
level judges within the state judiciary, the idea is unlikely to succeed
without the commitment of leadership within each courthouse.97 The
most powerful actors within the courthouse are the judges (although, as
discussed further below, the judges’ power is limited).98 As lawyers,
judges are part of an inherently conservative profession.99 And in many
jurisdictions, there are more specific disincentives to judge-led
innovation. Trial judges often are elected,100 and therefore (if they seek
longevity on the court) must consider the ramifications of their actions
on their chances for reelection. Thus, judges who “rock the boat” by
pushing change on those constituencies likely to care most about judicial
elections may find themselves voted out. And judges who pursue
policies that might be perceived as “soft on crime”—or who actively
seek more funds for new initiatives—also risk opposition from the
public or local political actors.101
95. See Kevin S. Burke, Leadership Without Fear, in FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS
2012 at 14, 16 (Carol R. Flango et al. eds., 2012) (“[N]o court starts from scratch. There is a history
in every courthouse.”).
96. See id. at 17.
97. See FEELEY, supra note 55, at 36 (suggesting that court reform may be initiated by
appellate courts or legislators, but “eventually institutions close to the court must assume
responsibility” for their implementation).
98. See Burke, supra note 95, at 15 (discussing the power relationship between judges and the
rest of the courthouse staff).
99. See id. (noting “[t]he training for lawyers, which is steeped in a commitment to precedent,
does not help” develop risk-taking judicial leaders); see also BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 26,
at 104 (2005) (noting the importance of “stability and continuity” to the judiciary, and describing it
as the branch of government “slowest to change” because of its reliance on precedent); id. (quoting
Judith Kaye, the long-time Chief Judge of New York, as observing that judges’ uniforms and
courthouse design had remained unchanged for centuries: “You don’t need a degree in semiotics to
conclude that ours is a profession that values formal stability and continuity.”).
100. See Judicial Selection: An Interactive Map, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.,
http://judicialselectionmap.brennancenter.org/?court=Trial (last visited Nov. 15, 2017) (reporting
that twenty-nine states use some form of election to select trial court judges); see also Methods of
Judicial Selection: Selection of Judges, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., http://www.judicialselection.us/
judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm?state= (last visited Nov. 15, 2017) (listing
method of selection and retention of the judges at every level in each state as well as the length of
their terms in particular states).
101. See AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: HOW AMERICA HOLDS COURT 27 (2009) (noting
various incentives for judges to “preserve the status quo”—even when they are elected and usually
run unopposed—including the possibility that powerful local actors like the sheriff and county
commission with control over the court’s budget “might support an opponent in the next election”);
Burke, supra note 95, at 15 (noting that courts “desperately need risk-taking leaders” but “fear that a
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Similarly, judges who seek promotion within the judiciary may shy
away from innovation. In many courthouses, the position of presiding
judge is awarded by a vote of the entire bench.102 Those who seek to
become the presiding judge to advance a reform agenda may find that
this very quality, if known to the other judges, is a disqualifier.103 Judges
who seek further advancement within the judiciary—for example, to
higher-level courts—similarly may find that their ambitions thwarted if
they become known as innovators. Since many judges start their judicial
careers on the misdemeanor courts, this is particularly a concern at the
misdemeanor level. Accordingly, although these new judges potentially
offer a fresh set of ideas, those with an eye on promotion may shy away
from controversy for fear of risking the public and political support
(including that of their fellow judges) necessary for election to the
position of presiding judge or higher judicial office.
The tenure of presiding judges also is an impediment to effective
cultural change. In many misdemeanor courts, the presiding judgeship is
a position of one or two years’ duration.104 Even if it is renewable,105 that
means the judge must be re-elected or re-appointed every year or two,
making it difficult to implement a reform plan than rankles one’s fellow
judges.106 It also takes time to meet with affected employees and
constituencies to solicit their input and “buy-in,” to develop performance
measurements, to train personnel on new policies, and to manage
failed initiative will generate bad news coverage or, worse yet, public criticism from the other
branches of government is chilling”).
102. See, e.g., Christine Hanley, New Presiding Judge Elected, L.A. TIMES (June 14, 2008),
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/14/local/me-briefs14.S5. The other common methods are
seniority or rotation, neither of which is conducive to promoting dedicated reformers.
See CHRISTINE M. DURHAM & DANIEL J. BECKER, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, A CASE
FOR COURT GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES COURTS 3 (2012), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/
HarvardExecSession_CourtGovernance.pdf.
103. See id. at 3 (noting that selecting the presiding judge by majority vote, or even by
seniority, can result in the choice of “judges who are least likely to challenge individual judicial
autonomy”).
104. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 29, at 17, 144 (“In the twelve courts [studied], and likely
in many others, the position of presiding judge is one of limited tenure.”); Griller, supra note 82, at
49 (noting that a two-year term is “one of the more prevalent terms of office for top administrative
judges nationwide”).
105. Griller, supra note 82, at 54 n.2 (noting that an increasing number of courts are now
allowing presiding judges to be re-elected by their peers to a second-year term).
106. According to one former administrative judge in the Bronx criminal courts, when he
asked for more resources, state court administrators told him they were not needed. William
Glaberson, Waiting Years for Day in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2013, at A1. In 2009, after years
of complaints, he was asked to step down. Id. Another former administrative judge in the Bronx also
was removed by court officials from his position after giving an interview in which he said more
resources were needed. Id. He was replaced by a judge with no prior experience in criminal court.
Id.
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performance. All the foregoing also takes resources, which generally are
not available without additional, time-consuming efforts to obtain
outside funding.107 Thus, the brief tenure of presiding judges can doom
reform before it ever gets off the ground.108
The limited authority of presiding judges, even while they are in
office, presents additional obstacles to effective cultural change. The
presiding judge typically is not a “boss” over her fellow judges so much
as “first among equals,” whose influence depends on “creating
consensus” or “building winning coalitions” rather than formal
authority.109 Despite a shift in recent decades toward greater
centralization of state courts, most courts today still are what
sociologists describe as “loosely coupled organizations,” meaning the
“individual elements [within them] display a relatively high level of
autonomy vis-à-vis the larger system within which they” operate.110
Individual judges have a great deal of discretion as to how to run their
courtrooms and their chambers and the matters handled therein.111 In
fact, such autonomy tends to be one of the features that attract certain
personalities to the job.112 This increases the leadership challenge for
presiding judges who attempt to steer their fellow judges in a unified
fashion toward reform.
Moreover, although the entire courthouse nominally is usually
under the supervision of the presiding judge—often aided by a chief
107. See De Muniz, supra note 65, at 4, 9-10 (suggesting that we are in a “decade of deficits”
in state court government); John A. Martin & Brenda J. Wagenknecht-Ivey, It’s a New Day: Future
Trends Require Revolutionary Changes in Courts, in FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 2011, at
135, 137-38 (Carol R. Flango et al. eds., 2011) (predicting “perpetual federal, state, and local
funding challenges” even when fiscal times improve).
108. DURHAM & BECKER, supra note 102, at 3 (the practice of rotating chief judges
“frequently results in tenures too short to permit effective engagement or accomplishment”).
109. FLEMMING ET AL., supra note 52, at 79-80; see also Ostrom et al., supra note 24, at 141
(“[J]udges see themselves as a group of equals. At best, presiding judges are viewed as a first
among equals—or an equal among firsts.”).
110. Griller, supra note 82, at 48; see also FLEMMING ET AL., supra note 52, at 106 (“Trial
courts are often congeries of single-member law firms located in the judges’ chambers and
courtrooms with the judges working as solo practitioners.”); NARDULLI ET AL., supra note 12, at 42
(noting that judges who hear criminal cases “are subject to very few bureaucratic controls in their
conduct of day-to-day affairs” and are “the most loosely organized segment of the court
community” after the private defense bar); De Muniz, supra note 65, at 19 (noting that most state
court systems are examples of the “loosely coupled organizational form”).
111. See Griller, supra note 82, at 48.
112. See id. (“It is no secret that some judges believe the traditional definitions of judicial
independence—freedom from control by other branches of government and freedom from
interference in case-related decisions—should include freedom from control by leadership judges
and managers responsible for the day-to-day operations of the court system.”); see also Burke,
supra note 95, at 14-15 (noting some judges’ hostility to “rules, regulations, and policy initiatives
that are foreign to what type of institution the judiciary should be”).
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court executive—in fact, the presiding judge has limited authority over
much of the court staff.113 As in many public agencies, court personnel
frequently enjoy protections under civil service laws and union contracts
regarding hiring and firing decisions.114 And some of the most important
actors within the courthouse—including prosecutors, police, and defense
lawyers—are not formally under the presiding judge’s control at all,
except when appearing in individual cases.115 Taken together, these
constraints make it that much harder for a presiding judge (as contrasted
with the executive of a private sector organization) to engage in several
of the steps necessary to cultural reform. For example, the presiding
judge may have a difficult time enlisting staff, prosecutors, and defense
lawyers in the process of designing and implementing a reform plan. The
presiding judge also may find that her ability to “manage performance”
is hindered by the limits on her authority to terminate non-compliant
employees and a lack of funds (and authority) to reward those who
excel. Thus, as with her fellow judges, the reform-minded leader must be
adept in deploying soft power. This is a rare quality in general, and it is
not one that law schools traditionally have focused on or that we have
otherwise devised a systematic mechanism for developing in judges.116
The number of competing interests that judges must satisfy also
poses an impediment to reform. Unlike a private organization, which is
subject to a clear “bottom line” imperative, a court—like many other
public agencies—must serve a number of goals.117 The court may have a
primary goal, however vague—e.g., to dispense justice—but it also must
113. In some states, the chief clerk of the court is an elected position, further complicating the
presiding judge’s authority. See Griller, supra note 82, at 49.
114. See John J. DiIulio, Jr., Measuring Performance When There Is No Bottom Line, in
PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 143, 144 (1993) (“Relative to
private managers, public managers in civil service bureaucracies have little discretion in hiring,
firing, and promotion decisions.”).
115. See, e.g., FEELEY, supra note 55, at 11-16 (discussing “fragmentation” in courthouses, as
the different institutional actors pursue their own agendas); Worden et al., supra note 22, at 525-26
(describing that although “in theory these actors might work together with the courts to provide
satisfactory criminal justice process outcomes, in practice they [are accountable to different
authorities and] operate along independent trajectories”).
116. Compare Steven Zeidman, Careful What You Wish For: Tough Questions, Honest
Answers, and Innovative Approaches to Appointive Judicial Selection, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 473,
481-82 (2007), with DURHAM & BECKER, supra note 102, at 5 (“The complexity of modern court
administration demands a set of skills not part of traditional judicial selection and training.”). In
general, the United States is a bit of an international anomaly in not treating judging as a specialized
profession requiring a separate course of study. See, e.g., Zeidman, supra, at 482 (noting how most
other countries have specialized training programs for judges).
117. WILSON, supra note 30, at 115. For this reason, some have argued that studies of private
sector businesses have little bearing on the study of public agencies, including courts. See, e.g.,
OSTROM ET AL., supra note 29, at 25-26 (quoting Wallace Sayre’s famous quip that public and
private organizations are “fundamentally alike in all unimportant respects”).
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serve “a large number of contextual goals—that is, descriptions of
desired states of affairs other than the one the agency was brought into
being to create.”118 For courts, these contextual goals may include
protecting defendant’s rights, the prompt disposition of cases, and
safeguarding the public fisc.119 As Wilson explained, these “other goals
define the context within which the primary goals can be sought.”120
Moreover, unlike a private business, a court has limited authority to raise
additional funds, reorganize, or adjust the volume of its work to meet
these various demands.121 This context makes the reformer’s task that
much trickier and requires skill in persuading external constituencies
(e.g. legislators and law enforcement) of the merits or necessity of
reform plans.
The sheer variability in the organizational structure and daily
operations of courts also hinders reform. Most courts may be “loosely
coupled organizations,” as discussed above, but each is loosely coupled
in its own unique way, and each operates in its own local context.122 This
makes rigorous research on the efficacy of new policies extremely
difficult, given the challenges that researchers confront in understanding
how each court works123 and in obtaining an adequate sample size and
control group for study.124 But it also means that reform-minded
presiding judges cannot simply borrow ideas from other courts. As
Ostrom et al. have observed, “most suggested solutions will not simply
plug-and-play in the court environment.”125 Because of courts’
decentralization and variation, “one size cannot fit all.”126 Thus, even if a
reform has been shown to be effective in one courthouse that does not
mean it will work in another.
118. WILSON, supra note 30, at 129.
119. As discussed further below, municipal courts, which adjudicate misdemeanors in many
jurisdictions, have become revenue streams that fund government services in many communities.
See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
120. WILSON, supra note 30, at 129.
121. See, e.g., Kevin S. Burke, A Vision for Enhancing Public Confidence in the Judiciary, 95
JUDICATURE 251, 253 (2012) (unlike firms in the private sector, courts “neither control the influx of
cases nor the laws that create them, and due process can occasionally be inefficient”).
122. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 29, at 12-17 (“[T]he institutional aegis under which the
judges work in the three states [studied herein] is different in terms of source of funding, method of
selection of court professionals, and the assignment and handling of cases, although the type and
amount of work they face is strikingly similar.”).
123. See, e.g., FLEMMING ET AL., supra note 52, at 13 (noting that “[d]iversity in the craft of
justice is a major obstacle to understanding America’s criminal courts”).
124. Id.
125. Ostrom, et al., supra note 24, at 140.
126. Id.; see also GREG BERMAN & AUBREY FOX, TRIAL AND ERROR IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
REFORM: LEARNING FROM FAILURE 8 (2010) (quoting Lisbeth Schorr, “Context is the most likely
saboteur of innovations.”).
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In sum, courts are particularly challenging organizations in which
to pursue cultural reform. Most courts are mature institutions with a
diversity of subcultures, with engrained assumptions about the
organization’s mission and values. Reform-minded leadership is difficult
to establish at all and even more so on a long-term basis. Even if such
leadership can be established, it often lacks critical authority and
resources to incentivize employees and other necessary actors to
participate in the reform process or to measure and manage performance.
The scarcity of resources places a premium on leveraging successful
ideas from other jurisdictions, but the diversity in the organizational
structure of courts and their contexts makes such borrowing particularly
risky. Courts are subject to a variety of demands, often in tension with
one another, which make it difficult for leaders to chart a path
of reform without engendering significant opposition from an
important constituency.
Misdemeanor courts exhibit many of these features to an even
greater degree than do felony courts. Nowhere are the structural
disincentives and barriers to innovation and effective judicial leadership
more daunting. For example, as noted above, the judges themselves
often are the least experienced judges in the criminal judge system. 127
Yet frequently they must manage the largest caseloads with the fewest
resources. At no other level of our state criminal courts is there such
variety in organizational structure and jurisdiction.128 Accountability for
individual actors within the court is at its nadir, because not only do
presiding judges and court executives lack resources to monitor what is
happening throughout their courthouses, but they also cannot count on
assistance in that task from the lawyers practicing therein—either
because there are no lawyers or the lawyers are too inexperienced to
realistically perform that function.129 Appeals from misdemeanor courts
127. At least one commentator has suggested that the quality of misdemeanor judges overall is
less than that of felony court judges, because the relatively lower status and salary of the position
attracts lesser applicants. See Primus, supra note 20, at 81. Regardless of whether that is true,
because they occupy the lowest rank in the court system, the judges on misdemeanor courts may be
particularly interested in moving up and therefore risk-averse; alternatively, they may lack the
confidence to innovate that often comes with experience. As Judge Victoria Pratt, now Chief Judge
of Newark’s Municipal Court, told a crowd at Rutgers Law School, most judges do not view
working in the lowest level criminal court as “a desirable assignment.” Judge Victoria Pratt ‘98
Requires Dignity and Justice in Her Courtroom, RUTGERS L. (Aug. 9, 2016),
https://law.rutgers.edu/news/judge-victoria-pratt-98-requires-dignity-and-justice-her-courtroom.
Instead, they “see it as a punishment, or as something to be endured.” Id.
128. See Methods of Judicial Selection: Limited Jurisdiction Courts, supra note 100 (listing
diverse organizational structures, methods of selection, and jurisdiction of limited jurisdiction
courts).
129. See Roberts, supra note 1, at 294-96 (discussing the impact of lawyers’ lack of experience
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are rare,130 further insulating what happens therein from review.
Moreover, the demand that judges serve the economic interests of their
communities is most acute at the misdemeanor court level, especially in
communities that have come to rely on the fines and fees imposed by
municipal courts to supplement their budgets.131 Taken altogether, the
obstacles to reform in these courts—the “front porch” of our judicial
system—are so great that one wonders if effective cultural change could
ever occur there.
Notwithstanding all the foregoing obstacles, there are presiding
judges around the country who are innovating in ways that hint at
significant cultural reform. The following section highlights three of
them, each in a very different setting: one from a small suburban
municipality in the Midwest, one from a medium-sized city in the South,
and one from the urban Northeast. It is too soon to say whether the
reforms these judges are pursuing will have long-term staying power and
in fact result in changes to the culture of their courts. However, at a
minimum, these judges represent the necessary first step to cultural
change: the emergence of strong leadership, capable of voicing the need
for change and pointing the organization in a new direction.132 In these
stories, one also finds evidence of several other factors identified in
Part I as key to successful cultural change, as well as several of the
on their confidence to intervene or report disturbing conduct). See generally Irene Oritseweyinmi
Joe, Rethinking Misdemeanor Neglect, 64 UCLA L. REV. 738 (2017) (discussing how public
defender offices routinely assign less experienced attorneys to handle misdemeanors).
130. For a variety of reasons—including the relative brevity of most sentences imposed—very
few defendants convicted of misdemeanors file an appeal or seek collateral review of their
convictions. See Roberts, supra note 1, at 319-20, 320 n.184, 337-40; see also Primus, supra note
20, at 81 (noting that “misdemeanor court judges are relatively insulated from higher court feedback
and do not learn of their mistakes in the same way that felony trial court judges do”).
131. See, e.g., CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 3, 42 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf (concluding that the
Ferguson, Missouri, Municipal Court handles most charges brought by the police department “not
with the primary goal of administering justice or protecting the rights of the accused, but of
maximizing revenue”); Radley Balko, New Report Details the Disastrous Municipal Court System
in St. Louis County, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-watch/wp/2014/10/28/new-report-details-the-disastrous-municipal-court-system-in-stlouis-county/?utm_term=.4f4301caa7c7 (reporting on how various Missouri municipalities rely on
court fines and fees to supplement their budgets); see also Peter A. Joy, Lawyers Serving as Judges,
Prosecutors, and Defense Lawyers at the Same Time: Legal Ethics and Municipal Courts, 51
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 23, 43 (2016) (suggesting that it is an “unrealistic expectation” that “a
municipality, which is dependent on court fines and fees, will not pressure its judge to focus on
generating fines and fees” rather than on the administration of justice); Tyler Whitson & Joy Diaz,
Why Your Speeding Ticket Doesn’t Pay for What You Think It Does, KUT NEWS (Apr. 22, 2015),
http://kut.org/post/why-your-speeding-ticket-doesn-t-pay-what-you-think-it-does (reporting on how
fees collected by municipal courts in Texas revert to the state).
132. See infra Part IV.
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factors identified in Part II as obstacles. Even if their endings are
uncertain, these stories provide reason for optimism about the possibility
of innovation as well as cautionary lessons for other reformers, subject
to all the caveats discussed above regarding the transferability of
experiences between courts.
IV.

STORIES OF INNOVATION

This section highlights three misdemeanor courts wherein judges
are re-imaging their roles and the court’s position in the community.
They come from three different states in distinct parts of the country. As
discussed further below, each has challenged fundamental assumptions
about the mission of their courts.
A. Midwestern Court of One: South Euclid, Ohio
The first story of innovation comes from South Euclid, Ohio, where
Judge Gayle Williams-Byers is the Administrative, Presiding, and only
Judge of the South Euclid Municipal Court.133 First elected in 2011 by
the citizens of South Euclid, a suburban municipality of approximately
21,000 residents that is ten miles from downtown Cleveland,134 Judge
Williams-Byers is the first African-American to hold her present
position.135 She graduated from Case Western Reserve School of Law in
2000 and also earned a master’s degree in non-profit management.136
Before becoming a judge, she worked as a prosecutor for approximately
ten years in the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office, including in its
drug court unit.137 She also worked as the manager of state affairs for a
highway safety advocacy organization, and as a legislative aide in the
United States Senate.138
133. JUDGE GAYLE F. WILLIAMS-BYERS, SOUTH EUCLID MUNICIPAL COURT, CUYAHOGA
COUNTY, OHIO, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT (2016), http://southeuclidcourt.com/wp-content/uploads/
2016/10/SEMC-2015-ANN-REP.pdf [hereinafter SOUTH EUCLID 2015 ANN. REP.]. The South
Euclid Municipal Court was established by an act of the Ohio State Legislature in 1952. See
GOLDEN JUBILEE 1917—1967 SOUTH EUCLID 31 (1967), https://www.cityofsoutheuclid.com/aboutsouth-euclid-images/golden_jubilee_se4.pdf. However, it has only had its own full-time judge for
about two decades. See Feb. 6, 2017 Meeting, SOUTH EUCLID CENTENNIAL 1917–2017 (Feb. 6,
2017), https://www.cityofsoutheuclid.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/South-Euclid-MunicipalCourt-Analysis.pdf.
134. Czarina Powell, Alumni Spotlight: Judge Gayle Williams-Byers ‘00, DOCKET, Feb. 20,
2012, at 1; see JAMES G. ZUPKA, CITY OF SOUTH EUCLID CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO, AUDIT REP.
FOR THE YEAR ENDED DEC. 31, 2013, at v (2014), https://ohioauditor.gov/auditsearch/
Reports/2014/City_South_Euclid_13-Cuyahga.pdf.
135. Powell, supra note 134.
136. SOUTH EUCLID 2015 ANN. REP., supra note 133; Powell, supra note 134, at 4.
137. Powell, supra note 134, at 4.
138. SOUTH EUCLID 2015 ANN. REP., supra note 133.
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The South Euclid Municipal Court presently has fourteen
employees, including Judge Williams-Byers.139 It has full jurisdiction
over misdemeanor cases and limited jurisdiction over the preliminary
stages of felony cases.140 It also handles traffic cases, evictions, and civil
cases with relatively small amounts in dispute.141 In 2015, the court
processed approximately 765 new misdemeanor cases and seventy-three
new felony cases.142
Since she began her first six-year term in January 2012, Judge
Williams-Byers has spearheaded several initiatives that challenge the
traditional court model. For example, she helped create Ohio’s first
suburban drug court in 2012.143 Assisted by a federal grant of close to $1
million,144 the program allows participating suburban courts to refer
cases to the Cleveland Municipal Drug Court, which then sends them
back to the originating court upon an individual’s successful completion
of treatment.145 In 2015, working with local prosecutors, defense
lawyers, and mental health professionals, Judge Williams-Byers helped
establish the first suburban specialized mental health docket in
Cuyahoga County.146 The program was supported by a grant of more
than $20,000 from the Ohio Mental Health Addiction Services Board147
and was recently extended by the Ohio Supreme Court through
December 2019.148 In her courtroom, Judge Williams-Byers engages
directly with the accused, often explaining in plain terms why conduct
139. Telephone Interview with Hon. Judge Gayle Williams-Byers, Administrative and
Presiding Judge, S. Euclid Mun. Court (July 31, 2017).
140. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1901.20 (West 2017).
141. Id. §§ 1901.17–.20.
142. SOUTH EUCLID 2015 ANN. REP., supra note 133.
143. Judge Gayle Gets Results!, FRIENDS OF JUDGE GAYLE, http://www.friendsofjudge
gayle.com/about (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
144. See Stan Donaldson, Greater Cleveland Drug Court Receives $975,000 Grant to Expand
Outreach Program, CLEVELAND.COM (Oct. 2, 2012, 5:36 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/
metro/index.ssf/2012/10/greater_cleveland_drug_court_r.html.
145. JUDGE GAYLE F. WILLIAMS-BYERS, SOUTH EUCLID MUNICIPAL COURT, CUYAHOGA
COUNTY, OHIO, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT (2015), http://southeuclidcourt.com/wp-content/uploads/
2016/02/SEMC-2014-ANN-REPORT.pdf.
146. Mental Health Docket Comes to South Euclid Court, S. EUCLID MUN. CT.,
http://southeuclidcourt.com/mental-health-docket (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
147. Letter from Judge Gayle Williams-Byers, S. Euclid Mun. Court to Mayor Georgine Welo
and Members, S. Euclid City Council (Mar. 17, 2016), in SOUTH EUCLID MUNICIPAL COURT,
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT (2016), http://southeuclidcourt.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/10/SEMC-2015-ANN-REP.pdf [herinafter Letter from Judge Gayle WilliamsByers 2016]; Specialized Docket Programs, OHIO.GOV, http://mha.ohio.gov/Default.aspx?
tabid=770 (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
148. See South Euclid Mental Health Docket Receives State Re-Certification,
S. EUCLID MUN. CT. (June 28, 2017), http://southeuclidcourt.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/
04/FREE-Recertification-Press-Release.pdf.
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that may appear victimless in fact is harmful to the community. 149 She
also employs non-traditional sanctions, such as essay or short video
assignments, in which defendants must explain their understanding of
the harm caused by their offense.150
Some of her innovations are geared toward making court more
“user-friendly” to working people and the other “good folks” whom
Judge Williams-Byers recognizes she often meets “on their worst
days.”151 For example, since 2012, she has conducted monthly night
court sessions at the Municipal Court so that litigants can come to court
without missing work.152 (She has shortened the court’s hours the day
following each of these sessions to compensate employees for these
additional evening hours). And litigants in both day and evening
sessions can obtain an appointment time for their appearance, keyed to
when they get out of work, to minimize the disruption to their lives.153
Judge Williams-Byers has also focused on technological
improvements to her court. When she arrived in 2012, court employees
still used floppy-disk drives and did not have work emails.154 The court
is now primarily paperless, utilizing an email notification system for
attorneys and online docketing.155 In 2014, with a grant from the Ohio
Supreme Court’s technology fund, Judge Williams-Byers launched a
program to livestream court proceedings so that the community could

149. See Powell, supra note 134, at 4.
150. Telephone Interview with Hon. Judge Gayle Williams-Byers, supra note 139.
151. See Judge Gayle Williams-Byers Responds About Her Work Presiding over the South
Euclid Municipal Court, CLEVELAND.COM: LYNDNHURST AND S. EUCLID CMTY. BLOG (Dec. 28,
2015), http://www.cleveland.com/lyndhurst-south-euclid/index.ssf/2015/12/judge_gayle_williamsbyers_res.html; Telephone Interview with Hon. Judge Gayle Williams-Byers, supra note 139.
152. See Letter from Judge Gayle Williams-Byers, South Euclid Mun. Court to Mayor
Georgine Welo and Members, South Euclid City Council (Sept. 1, 2013), in SOUTH EUCLID
MUNICIPAL COURT, CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT (2014),
http://southeuclidcourt.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/annualReport2014.pdf [herinafter Letter
from Judge Gayle Williams-Byers 2013]; Jeff Piorkowski, South Euclid Municipal Court
to Conduct Night Court Dockets on Third Thursday of Each Month, CLEVELAND.COM
(May 11, 2012, 10:50 AM), http://www.cleveland.com/lyndhurst-south-euclid/index.ssf/2012/05/
south_euclid_municipal_court_t.html. The night court meets on the fourth Thursday of each month
from 5:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. Night Court, S. EUCLID MUN. CT., http://southeuclidcourt.com/nightcourt (last visited Nov. 15, 2017). The schedule of upcoming night court sessions is posted on the
court website. Id.
153. See Judge Gayle Williams-Byers Responds About Her Work Presiding over the South
Euclid Municipal Court, supra note 151; Night Court, supra note 152.
154. See Adam Ferrise, South Euclid Municipal Court Will Become First Area Court to Offer
Online Live-Streaming, CLEVELAND.COM (Feb. 18, 2014, 8:10 AM), http://www.cleveland.com/
lyndhurst-south-euclid/index.ssf/2014/02/south_euclid_municipal_court_w.html.
155. See Letter from Judge Gayle Williams-Byers 2013, supra note 152 (reporting on
technological improvements initiated in 2012).
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view court proceedings at its convenience.156 The South Euclid City
Council, which uses the Municipal courtroom to hold its meetings, also
makes use of this technology.157
Judge Williams-Byers is active in the community, including serving
on the board of an organization that provides treatment to substancedependent youth and their families.158 Under her leadership, the court
also sponsors activities that bring the community into the courthouse,
including “Democracy Days” for local students to sit in on proceedings
and discuss them with the judge;159 speakers and film screenings; canned
food drives; and free car washes in the summer, in which Judge
Williams-Byers participates alongside those required to do so as part of
their court-ordered community service.160 Judge Williams-Byers
maintains an active media presence, including regular press interviews,
Facebook pages, and other online accounts,161 and is a regular
participant in judicial conferences.162 The court website prominently

156. Letter from Judge Gayle Williams-Byers 2016, supra note 147.
157. Id. (describing grant received from Ohio Supreme Court’s technology fund to improve
live-streaming capabilities).
158. See, e.g., Judge Williams-Byers Visits ArcTech Students, S. EUCLID LYNDHURST SCHS.,
http://www.sel.k12.oh.us/protected/articleView.aspx?iid=6G32AA2&dasi=3PI2 (last visited Nov.
15, 2017); Telephone Interview with Hon. Judge Gayle Williams-Byers, supra note 139.
159. Letter from Judge Gayle Williams-Byers 2016., supra note 147.
160. Letter from Judge Gayle Williams-Byers, S. Euclid Mun. Court to Mayor Georgine Welo
and Members, South Euclid City Council (Dec. 23, 2015), in SOUTH EUCLID MUNICIPAL COURT,
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT (2015), http://southeuclidcourt.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/SEMC-2014-ANN-REPORT.pdf [herinafter Letter from Judge Gayle
Williams-Byers 2015].
161. See, e.g., Judge Gayle Williams-Byers Discusses Grand Juries and Public Distrust,
WOUB DIGITAL (Dec. 8, 2014), https://woub.org/2014/12/08/judge-gayle-williams-byersdiscusses-grand-juries-and-public-distrust; Judge Williams-Byers Explains Domestic Violence
Issues, WOUB DIGITAL (Sept. 29, 2014), https://woub.org/2014/09/29/judge-williams-byersexplains-domestic-violence-issues; Judge Gayle Williams-Byers Talks Technological Revolution in
the Courts, WOUB DIGITAL (Nov. 19, 2013), https://woub.org/2013/11/19/judge-gayle-willaimsbyers-talks-technological-revolution-courts; Judge Gayle Williams-Byers (@JudgeGayle),
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/JudgeGayle (last visited Nov. 15, 2017); Reelect Judge
Gayle, FRIENDS OF JUDGE GAYLE, http://www.friendsofjudgegayle.com (last visited Nov. 15,
2017) (providing dedication to reelection effort); South Euclid Municipal Court
(@SouthEuclidMunicipalCourt), FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/SouthEuclidMunicipal
Court (last visited Nov. 15, 2017); South Euclid Municipal Court (@SE_Court), TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/se_court (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
162. See Sara Dorn, South Euclid Judge Gayle Williams-Byers Spent $9,800 on Travel:
Frequent Flyers, CLEVELAND.COM: LYNDHURST & S. EUCLID CMTY. BLOG (Dec. 28, 2015,
8:37
AM), http://www.cleveland.com/lyndhurst-south-euclid/index.ssf/2015/08/south_euclid_
judge_gayle_willi_2.html [hereinafter Dorn, Frequent Flyers] (noting that Judge Williams-Byers
attended eleven conferences in her first three years in office).
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displays the motto, “Justice, Service, Community”163 and a logo selected
by local students.164
Judge Williams-Byers has invested in the development of her staff
at the court, all of whom are “at will” employees, and in their
commitment to her objectives.165 Most employees reside in South
Euclid, the community served by the court.166 At the beginning of her
tenure, Judge Williams-Byers met with every hold-over member of the
court staff and discussed what she hoped to accomplish together.167 She
also asked each employee to pick two out of the five points from Judge
Williams-Byers’s election platform that most interested the employee,
and to suggest ideas for how the court could best achieve those
objectives.168 She has instituted weekly “lunch and learn” programs, at
which staff and outside experts are invited to present about topics
identified by staff as being of interest to them.169 Using funds from a
Special Projects Fund authorized by the Ohio legislature as a percentage
of court fees, she has twice taken the court staff on day-long retreats to
focus on topics including customer service, professionalism, and
technology.170 Because court employees are “at will,” Judge WilliamsByers enjoys more latitude to discipline them than many other judges do
in courthouses staffed with civil service employees.171 She also enjoys
the discretion to provide incentives, such as the forty paid hours per year
she offers all court employees to perform volunteer service with any
organization of their choice.172
Judge Williams-Byers was re-elected in November 2017, in “what
was arguably the most closely watched judicial race in Cuyahoga
163. See S. EUCLID MUN. CT., http://southeuclidcourt.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
164. Letter from Judge Gayle Williams-Byers 2015, supra note 160.
165. Telephone Interview with Hon. Judge Gayle Williams-Byers, supra note 139.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Sara Dorn, South Euclid Municipal Court Closed, Spent $507 for Training
Day at Dave & Buster’s, CLEVELAND.COM: LYNDHURST & S. EUCLID CMTY. BLOG, http://
www.cleveland.com/lyndhurst-south euclid/index.ssf/2015/05/south_euclid_municipal_court_c_1.
html (last updated May 1, 2015, 8:09 AM).
171. For example, the Clerk of the Court has been disciplined for closing the court early
without permission, refusing to retrieve a document for a prosecutor, and failing to train a fellow
employee. See Sara Dorn, South Euclid Municipal Court Clerk Absent for More Than a Month
Following Suspensions, CLEVELAND.COM: LYNDHURST & S. EUCLID CMTY. BLOG,
http://www.cleveland.com/
lyndhurst-south-euclid/index.ssf/2015/05/south_euclid_municipal_court_c_3.html (last updated
May 5, 2015, 8:06 AM). The Clerk was required to complete a customer service, professionalism
and work-flow management course. Id.
172. Telephone Interview with Hon. Judge Gayle Williams-Byers, supra note 139.
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County this year.”173 South Euclid’s Mayor (who has served in that
office since 2003) and the City Council have both called for the abolition
of the municipal court,174 arguing that South Euclid can no longer afford
to maintain its own court given its declining population and tax base.175
However, they also have cited the court’s low case clearance rate
relative to other Ohio cities under Judge Williams-Byers’s leadership,
and the fact that it has not returned money to the city’s coffers.176 On the
latter point, the council has compared Judge Williams-Byers’s track
record to that of her predecessor,177 even though the difference in fee
generation is largely attributable to the city council having transferred
responsibility for collection of parking tickets from the Municipal Court
to the police department during Judge Williams-Byers’s tenure.178 The
mayor and police chief also have opposed some of her drug policy
initiatives, with the police for a time refusing to refer cases to the
suburban drug court she helped establish.179 The City Council also has
opposed providing mental health benefits to non-residents of South
Euclid.180 Her travel to judicial conferences also has drawn negative
attention, with comparisons drawn to her predecessor, who in eighteen

173. Peter Krouse, Judge Gayle Williams-Byers Keeps South Euclid Municipal Courts Seat,
CLEVELAND.COM (Nov. 8, 2017 6:59 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2017/11/
judge_gayle_williams-byers_kee.html
174. See Sara Dorn, South Euclid Charter Review Commission, Municipal Court Judge Gayle
Willaims-Byers Pays Attorneys to Argue Charter Proposals, http://www.cleveland.com/lyndhurstsouth-euclid/index.ssf/2015/03/south_euclid_charter_review_co.html (last updated Mar. 5, 2015
8:40 PM) [herinafter Dorn, South Euclid Charter Review Commission]; Sara Dorn, South Euclid
Judge Gayle Williams-Byers Pays Lawyers Public Money to Review Charter Proposals,
CLEVELAND.COM: LYNDHURST & S. EUCLID CMTY. BLOG, http://www.cleveland.com/lyndhurstsouth-euclid/index.ssf/2015/01/south_euclid_judge_gayle_willi.html (last updated Jan. 29, 2015,
5:13 PM).
175. See Sara Dorn, South Euclid Charter Review Commission, supra note 174.
176. See Jeff Piorkowski, Council Tables Talks about South Euclid Municipal Court Merger;
Will Discuss Ways to Increase Revenues, CLEVELAND.COM: LYNDHURST & S. EUCLID CMTY.
BLOG, http://www.cleveland.com/lyndhurst-south-euclid/index.ssf/2016/04/south_euclid_municipal
_court.html (last updated Apr. 4, 2016, 11:39 AM).
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See Sara Dorn, South Euclid Judge Accuses Mayor of Not Making Drug Enforcement a
Priority, CLEVELAND.COM: LYNDHURST & S. EUCLID CMTY. BLOG, http://www.cleveland.com/
lyndhurst-south-euclid/index.ssf/2015/05/south_euclid_judgebyers_lashes.html (last upated May 26,
2015, 12:52 PM). For a review of the email and letters exchanged between Judge Williams-Byers
and the Mayor see South Euclid Judge Scrutinizes Mayor Georgine Welo, SCRIBD,
https://www.scribd.com/document/265916881/South-Euclid-Judge-scrutinizes-Mayor-GeorgineWelo (lasted visited Nov. 15, 2017). The South Euclid Police Chief claimed that the city was not
experiencing a significant heroin problem and that his department had not referred any cases to the
suburban drug court because charges would have to be reduced to misdemeanors. Dorn, supra.
180. Telephone Interview with Hon. Judge Gayle Williams-Byers, supra note 139.
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years on the bench never traveled out of state.181 Judge Williams-Byers
regularly appears before the City Council and corresponds with its
members to discuss their concerns about the court, which appear to pose
the greatest obstacle to the longevity of her reform agenda.182
B. A Southern Court of Nine: Birmingham, Alabama
The second story of innovation comes from the Municipal Court of
Birmingham, Alabama, the state’s largest city with approximately
212,000 residents.183 Judge Andra D. Sparks is the Presiding Judge of
the Court, which presently has five full-time judges, four part-time
judges and over one hundred employees in total.184 The Birmingham
Municipal Court has jurisdiction over misdemeanor criminal and traffic
cases.185 In 2015, it handled approximately 12,000 non-traffic related
cases,186 of which over 10,000 were misdemeanor cases.187 Per Alabama
law, the term of any full-time municipal judge is four years.188 In 2008,
the Birmingham City Council first appointed Judge Sparks to a seat on
the Municipal Court to preside over its specialty drug and gun courts.189
181. See Dorn, Frequent Flyers, supra note 162. After Judge Williams-Byers defended her
travel, the publication clarified that it did not mean to imply any wrongdoing. See Judge Gayle
Williams-Byers Responds About Her Work Presiding over the South Euclid Municipal Court,
CLEVELAND.COM: LYNDHURST & S. EUCLID CMTY. BLOG, http://www.cleveland.com/lyndhurstsouth-euclid/index.ssf/2015/12/judge_gayle_williams-byers_res.html (last updated Dec. 28, 2015,
12:38 PM); see also Dorn, Frequent Flyers, supra note 162 (updating post after Judge WillaimsByers provided response).
182. See, e.g., Jeff Piorkowski, Lyndhurst, South Euclid to Hold Heroin Crisis Forums,
CLEVELAND.COM: LYNDHURST & S. EUCLID CMTY. BLOG, http://www.cleveland.com/lyndhurstsouth-euclid/index.ssf/2017/03/heroin.html (last updated Mar. 7, 2017, 5:57 PM).
183. See Quickfacts: Birmingham City, Alabama, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://
www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/birminghamcityalabama/PST045216 (last visited Nov. 15,
2017) (showing population census for 2010 and estimate for 2016). Birmingham is the largest city
in Alabama. See MAYOR WILLIAM A. BELL, SR., BIRMINGHAM FORWARD, MAYOR’S PROPOSED
OPERATING BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR JULY 1, 2016–JUNE 30, 2017, at 3 (2017) (on file with the
Hofstra Law Review) [hereinafter BIRMINGHAM MAYOR’S PROPOSED BUDGET FY 2017].
184. Telephone Interview with Judge Andra D. Sparks, Presiding Judge, Birmingham Mun.
Court (July 25, 2017). For slightly less up-to-date statistics, see MAYOR WILLIAM A. BELL, SR.,
BIRMINGHAM FORWARD, MAYOR’S PROPOSED OPERATING BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR JULY 1,
2015—JUNE 30, 2016, at 75-76 (2016) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review) (listing Municipal
Court personnel).
185. See Birmingham Municipal Court, BIRMINGHAM FORWARD, https://www.birmingham
al.gov/municipal-court (last visited Nov. 15, 2017) (citing ALA. CODE § 12-14-1 (1975); and then
citing BIRMINGHAM, ALA. CODE § 8 (1944)).
186. See MAYOR WILLIAM A. BELL, SR., BIRMINGHAM FORWARD, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL
FINANCIAL REPORT: CITY OF BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA FOR THE YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2016, at 145
tbl.E-6 (2016) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
187. Telephone Interview with Judge Andra D. Sparks, supra note 184.
188. See ALA. CODE § 12-14-30(b). Part time judges are appointed for two-year terms. Id.
189. Leadership, 45TH STREET BAPTIST CHURCH, http://45bc.org/about-us/leadership (last
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In 2010, the Mayor of Birmingham, who has sole authority to appoint
the Presiding Judge, named Judge Sparks to that post.190 In 2012 and
again in 2017, the City Council re-appointed Judge Sparks to his
judgeship on the Municipal Court.191 He continues to serve as Presiding
Judge, at the pleasure of the Mayor.192
A 1988 graduate of the University of Alabama School of Law,
Judge Sparks served in the military before he became a judge, including
four years in the United States Army Judge Advocate General Corps.193
He also spent several years in private practice.194 He started his judicial
career in 1995 on the Family Court of Jefferson County, where he served
for twelve years.195 For over ten years, Judge Sparks also has served as a
pastor at a local Baptist Church, and he is actively involved in numerous
community organizations.196 He regularly sees the people who appear
before him in court in Church and in the supermarket where he shops.197
During his tenure on the Municipal Court, Judge Sparks has established
numerous specialty dockets—in addition to the drug and gun courts—
including a bilingual court to consolidate cases requiring interpreters;198
a veteran’s court;199 and a homeless court, which connects defendants
with needed services, shelter, and employment.200 He also has started
several other innovative programs, such as an initiative enabling inmates
at the city jail to work toward their General Education Degree (“GED”),

visited Nov. 15, 2017).
190. Id. Per Alabama law, although the city council, as the governing body of the municipality,
appoints municipal court judges, the mayor has authority to designate the presiding judge whenever
a municipality has more than one judge. ALA. CODE § 12-14-30(a), (c). He took over from
Raymond Chambliss. See Madison Underwood, Chambliss Beats Huff for Jefferson County Juvenile
Court Seat, AL.COM, http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2012/11/chambliss_beats_huff_for_jeffe.html
(last updated Nov. 6, 2012, 11:12 PM).
191. See Leadership, supra note 189; Andra Sparks, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/
andra-sparks-b033117 (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
192. See Birmingham Municipal Court, supra note 185.
193. Chandra Sparks Splond, Meet Our First-Ever Daddy of the Month: Andra D. Sparks,
CHANDRA SPARKS SPLOND BLOG (June 6, 2016), http://chandrasparkssplond.com/blog/andra-dsparks; Leadership, supra note 189.
194. Splond, supra note 193.
195. Id.
196. See Leadership, supra note 189; Splond, supra note 193.
197. Telephone Interview with Judge Andra D. Sparks, supra note 184.
198. See CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, supra note 18, at 186.
199. History of Veterans Courts, ALA. B. ASS’N (Apr. 30, 2014), https://www.alabar.org/
assets/uploads/2014/11/History-of-Veterans-Courts.pdf.
200. See, e.g., Specialty Courts, BIRMINGHAM FORWARD, https://www.birminghamal.gov/
municipal-court/specialty-courts (last visited Nov. 15, 2017); ‘Turning Point Court’ Helps
Birmingham’s Homeless Get Back on Their Feet, WBRC, http://www.wbrc.com/story/30049615/
turning-point-court-helps-birminghams-homeless-get-back-on-their-feet (last visited Nov. 15, 2015,
8:04 PM) (describing “Turning Point Court” for the homeless).
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take classes on domestic violence or sex education, or participate in
Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous.201 Defendants who
complete a GED are rewarded with a decrease in their fines, and those
who wish to continue the program after their release can do so at the
courthouse or at the campus of a local community college.202 Judge
Sparks has also established a program to help people obtain or clear their
drivers’ licenses.203 Most recently, in 2017, Judge Sparks established a
new pretrial services division within the court, staffed by social workers
and new part-time judges, to expedite initial appearances and to put
individuals in touch with needed mental health or substance abuse
treatment more quickly.204 Judge Sparks explained the need for the new
division to the City Council, “People think [municipal court] is all about
tickets and jail . . . but really a lot of our job is to try to keep people out
of jail, [such as] people with mental health issues. That is why we are
hiring social workers.”205
Judge Sparks has also focused on the customer service aspects of
the court, for example establishing online payment and payment by
credit card for court fees and fines.206 He has established a late afternoon
docket, available from 4:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. every day of the week
except Friday, so people do not have to miss work to appear in court.207
As in South Euclid, appointments are available for a precise date and
time so that litigants need not wait around indefinitely for their cases to
be called.208
Judge Sparks has enlisted the rest of his court in these projects. For
example, the other judges in his court—all of whom joined the court
after Judge Sparks was appointed—participate in the specialty dockets,
and Judge Sparks has required all new judges to attend training sessions
201. See Melanie Posey, New Educational Program Offered to Birmingham Inmates, WTVM
(2013), http://www.wtvm.com/story/23707364/new-educational-program-offered-to-birminghaminmates.
202. Id.
203. See Birmingham Municipal Court Helps over 600 Citizens Receive Driver’s Licenses
via RENEW Program, BIRMINGHAM FORWARD, https://www.birminghamal.gov/2017/03/28/
birmingham-municipal-court-helps-over-600-citizens-receive-drivers-licenses-via-renew-program
(last visited Nov. 15, 2017) (noting that the program, launched in 2014, had helped more 600 people
reinstate their licenses).
204. See Erin Edgemon, Birmingham Appoints 2 Special Judges for New Municipal Court
Division, AL.COM, http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2017/02/birmingham_hires_2_
special_jud.html (last updated Feb. 11, 2017, 8:04 AM).
205. Id.
206. See CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, supra note 18, at 184.; Information and Payment Options,
BIRMINGHAM FORWARD, https://www.birminghamal.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Informationand-Payment-Options2.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
207. Telephone Interview with Judge Andra D. Sparks, supra note 184.
208. Id.
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at the National Judicial College on topics like procedural justice.209
While the court’s other employees are civil servants, Judge Sparks has
obtained their “buy in” for his reform efforts by focusing on training and
employees’ sense of professional fulfillment. For example, using a
court-training fund authorized by state law (and funded, as in Ohio, by a
portion of court fees), Judge Sparks has made training opportunities
available to employees at every level of the court.210 Judge Sparks has
taken the entire courthouse staff on a full-day retreat each year,
dedicated to a single issue.211 Past topics have included implicit bias and
customer service.212 He also encourages employees to take exams to
advance their civil service level.213 In some cases, employees have then
left the Municipal Court for higher paying positions elsewhere at their
new level.214 But in other cases, Judge Sparks has successfully lobbied
the City Council for additional funds to retain those employees at higher
salaries, having made the case that their retention is worthwhile.215
Judge Sparks also manages the organization-environment boundary
by inviting members of the City Council and other prominent officials
into his court. For example, he regularly invites local politicians to
graduation ceremonies for his specialty courts—often as the featured
speaker—so that they will be exposed to the benefits of the programs.216
His court also helps bar associations put on annual conferences, offering
free CLE credit to local prosecutors and defense lawyers, to educate
them about the newest programs offered by the court and their
benefits.217 In addition, like Judge Williams-Byers, Judge Sparks
maintains a significant online presence,218 is a regular public speaker,219
209. Id.
210. CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, supra note 18, at 184.
211. Id.; see also COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF BIRMINGHAM, REGULAR MEETING OF THE
COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF BIRMINGHAM 9 (2015), http://bhamal.granicus.com/Document
Viewer.php?file=bhamal_25e4a76eac133c6d98d2ef49aba2dde2.pdf&view=1
(providing
city
council resolution approving nearly $9000 for Municipal Court Department staff retreat).
212. CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, supra note 18, at 184; Telephone Interview with Judge Andra
D. Sparks, supra note 184.
213. Telephone Interview with Judge Andra D. Sparks, supra note 184.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See Volunteer Lawyers Program CLE, BIRMINGHAM BAR ASS’N, http://birmingham
bar.org/events/EventDetails.aspx?id=863576 (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
218. See, e.g., Andra Sparks, supra note 191; Andra Sparks (@revdocdra), TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/revdocdra?lang=en (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
219. See, e.g., Tab Bowling, From Mayor Bowling—Alabama League of Municipalities Annual
Convention, OFFICIAL BLOG OF DECATUR, AL (May 23, 2017), http://blog.decaturalabamausa.com/
mayor-bowling-alabama-league-municipalities-annual-convention (recounting Judge Sparks’
speech at the 2017 Alabama League of Municipalities Annual Convention); Volunteer
Lawyers Program CLE, supra note 217 (announcing October 2016 program to train lawyers to
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and participates in numerous judicial conferences.220 He has become a
proficient grant-writer, having researched and obtained a variety of
grants from the federal government and the state courts.221
Judge Sparks also has made judicious use of symbols. For example,
each year, he has purchased shirts with the municipal court logo for
every member of the courthouse staff to reinforce that they are part of a
single team.222 Although not required to, many regularly wear these
shirts—in part because they satisfy the requirements of the courthouse
dress code, applicable to all participating in or attending proceedings in
the courtrooms, adopted to “maintain the dignity, integrity, decorum,
seriousness and professional atmosphere of the Court and the
administration of justice.”223 The dress code, which is posted on the
court’s website, prohibits, among other things, eating, chewing gum,
cellphone use, reading, or sleeping in the courtroom. 224 The courthouse
website also prominently features the courthouse motto, “Where
Accountability Meets Compassion,”225 reflecting the judicial philosophy
Judge Sparks developed during his years working in the family court.
Specifically, he believes that those appearing on the “front porch” of the
criminal justice system should be treated compassionately but with
sufficient firmness that they will be discouraged from returning to, or
advancing further within, the house of justice.226
C. A Northeastern Court of Eleven: Newark, New Jersey
The third story of innovation comes from the Newark, New Jersey,
Municipal Court where Victoria Pratt until November 2017 was the
Chief Judge and ran the community court. A 1998 graduate of Rutgers
Law School, Judge Pratt is the first person of Dominican descent to
serve as Municipal Court Judge in Newark.227 Then-Mayor Cory Booker
represent the homeless, with Judge Sparks as featured speaker).
220. See, e.g., Center for Court Innovation Hosts Community Justice 2016, CTR. FOR CT.
INNOVATION (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.courtinnovation.org/center-court-innovation-hostscommunity-justice-2016.
221. See Jeremy Gray, Ceremony Honors Graduates of Birmingham Drug, Gun Courts,
AL.COM, http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2010/06/ceremony_honors_graduates_of_b.html (last updated
June 15, 2010, 9:07 PM) (describing $350,000 grant from the U.S. Department of Justice).
222. See BIRMINGHAM MAYOR’S PROPOSED BUDGET FY 2017, supra note 183, at 99 (showing
no proposed budget for special events in the coming year, but $5000 for clothing for city personnel);
Telephone Interview with Judge Andra D. Sparks, supra note 184.
223. See CITY OF BIRMINGHAM MUN. COURT, ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER. 2013-1, DRESS CODE
POLICY (2013) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER].
224. Id.
225. See BIRMINGHAM MUNICIPAL COURT, supra note 185.
226. Telephone Interview with Judge Andra D. Sparks, supra note 184.
227. See Chanta L. Jackson, Scenes from Swearing in Ceremony for Judge Victoria F. Pratt,
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appointed her to the court in November 2009.228 Previously, she worked
as counsel for two state governors, as a compliance officer for the
Camden school district, and as counsel to the President of the Newark
Municipal Council.229 The Newark Municipal Court has approximately
eleven judges, serving a city with approximately 280,000 people,230 and
a docket three times the size of the next largest city in New Jersey.231 It
has jurisdiction over misdemeanors and lower-level offenses, housing
matters, and traffic violations.232 Per New Jersey law, the Newark
Mayor, with the advice and consent of the City Council, appoints each
judge, for a term of three years.233 In 2014, Judge Pratt was elevated to
Chief Judge of the court.234
Pratt is a protégé of Judge Alex Calabrese, the founding judge of
the Red Hook Community Court in Brooklyn, New York, which was a
pioneer in the “problem-solving” court movement.235 Pratt first learned
about the Red Hook court while working for the Newark City Council,
when Newark was considering creating a similar court.236 Intrigued by
the idea, she went to visit the Red Hook Court and endorsed the creation
of a similar court in Newark.237 A few years later, she was appointed to
the Newark Municipal Court and—after eight months in traffic court—
in 2010 was tasked with running the new court for Newark based on the
Red Hook model.238 By 2011, that court was up and running, with a
range of counseling services and alternative sanctions like community
NJ.COM, http://www.nj.com/newark/index.ssf/2009/11/scenes_from_swearing_in_ceremo.html (last
updated Nov. 6, 2009, 9:42 PM).
228. Id.
229. David Giambusso, Litigator Who Uncovered Corruption Is Sworn in As
First Dominican Judge in Newark, NJ.COM, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/11/
litigator_who_uncovered_corrup.html (last updated Nov. 7, 2009, 10:31 AM); Rosenberg, supra
note 75.
230. Giambusso, supra note 229; Quickfacts: Newark, New Jersey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/newarkcitynewjersey/PST045216 (last visited Nov.
15, 2017) (reporting the Newark population estimate as of July 1, 2016).
231. See Giambusso, supra note 229.
232. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2B:12-17, -20 (West 2017).
233. See id. § 2B:12-4.
234. See Allan Wolper, Newark Chief Municipal Judge Victoria F. Pratt: Reforming the
Criminal Justice System, WBGO (June 22, 2017), http://wbgo.org/post/newark-chief-municipaljudge-victoria-f-pratt-reforming-criminal-justice-system#stream/0 (March 2015 radio interview with
Judge Pratt).
235. See Rosenberg, supra note 75.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.; see also Abram Brown, Newark Introduces Court Program to Offer Community
Service for Minor Offenses, NJ.COM (June 17, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.nj.com/
news/index.ssf/2011/06/newark_officials_announce_new.html (discussing an innovative Newark
court program under the leadership of Judge Pratt).
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service provided though a non-profit partner.239 However, even before
those services were in place, Judge Pratt started running her courtroom
differently than most other judges, incorporating the procedural
justice practices she had observed in Red Hook. For example, she
emphasizes using comprehensible, courteous language; making eye
contact; providing those appearing before her an opportunity to be heard;
and engaging with them as individuals, including applauding
their accomplishments.240 She has described her mission as nothing less
than transforming the culture of the courtroom, hoping that her example
of treating others with respect will inspire those appearing in her
courtroom to respond in kind.241
Judge Pratt also has been a vocal public advocate for her approach
to criminal justice to those at the organizational-environmental
boundary—for example, giving a TED talk and making other media
appearances,242 speaking at academic, bar and other events,243 and
maintaining an active online profile.244 The court website prominently
displays its mission statement, an important symbol, which it represents
as “the fair and just resolution of disputes in order to preserve the rule of

239. Brown, supra note 238.
240. Rosenberg, supra note 75.
241. See Judge Victoria Pratt ‘98 Requires Dignity and Justice in Her Courtroom, supra note
127 (describing remarks delivered by Judge Victoria Pratt at Rutgers Law School).
242. See Victoria Pratt, How Judges Can Show Respect, TED, https://www.ted.com/
talks/victoria_pratt_how_judges_can_show_respect (last visited Nov. 15, 2017); see also
Community Court: A Kinder, Gentler Way?, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/video/due-processcommunity-court-kinder-gentler-way (last visited Nov. 15, 2017) (interviewing Judge Pratt with
MSNBC online host Sandra King regarding the Newark Community Court); Melissa HarrisPerry, Meet the Judge Who Assigns Essays in Court, MSNBC (July 11, 2015),
http://www.msnbc.com/melissa-harris-perry/watch/meet-the-judge-who-assigns-essays-in-court482752067786 (interviewing Judge Pratt with MSNBC host Melissa Harris-Perry); Allan Wolper,
Newark Chief Municipal Judge Victoria F. Pratt: Reforming the Criminal Justice System,
WBGO (June 22, 2017), http://wbgo.org/post/newark-chief-municipal-judge-victoria-f-prattreforming-criminal-justice-system#stream/0 (radio interview with Judge Pratt); Writing GoalDriven Essays Will Change Your Life, MSNBC: THE DOCKET (Aug. 25, 2015),
http://www.msnbc.com/the-docket/watch/writing-goal-driven-essays-will-change-your-life512763459944 (interviewing Judge Pratt with MSNBC host Seema Iyer).
243. See Her Legacy Conference Speakers, Women Everywhere Believe http://webelieve.nyc/
wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Speakers-Bio-Headshots.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2017) (providing a
biography for Judge Pratt, listing her many conferences and speeches, including at a White House
conference, the American Judges Association Annual Conference, and the International Community
Courts Conference, as well as numerous law schools); Kelly Tait, Conference Spotlight: Keynote
Speaker Judge Victoria Pratt on Procedural Fairness, NAT’L ASS’N ST. JUD. EDUCATORS (Aug. 29,
2016),
http://nasje.org/conference-spotlight-keynote-speaker-judge-victoria-pratt-on-proceduralfairness (announcing that Judge Pratt would give keynote speech at 2016 Annual Conference).
244. See, e.g., Victoria Pratt, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/victoria-pratt-153588b
(last visited Nov. 15, 2017); Victoria Pratt (@JudgeVPratt), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/
judgevpratt?lang=en (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
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law and to protect the rights and liberties guaranteed by
the Constitution and the laws of the United States and
this State.”245
In November 2017, Judge Pratt stepped down from the bench to
pursue criminal justice reform full time.246 The Newark community
court continues, presided over by a different judge. It is too soon to
assess the impact of Judge Pratt’s departure on the court. However, her
example remains important, particularly for those who question whether
innovation is possible in busy urban courts and despair even of
cultivating the requisite leadership. It may be harder to accomplish
lasting reform in large urban areas with crushing caseloads, but the
challenge is not necessarily insurmountable.
V.

CONCLUSION

The misdemeanor courts that preside over most criminal cases in
the United States vary in myriad ways such as size, structure,
jurisdiction, and method of appointment. Each also has its own legal
culture, a settled way of doing things that reflects deeper assumptions
about the court’s mission and its role in the community. Changing the
way that courts do business often requires adjustments not only to their
superficial routines, but also to the more fundamental norms and shared
beliefs of those who constitute the courthouse community. It also
requires conversion, or at least management, of the expectations of
external actors like legislators and police who wield influence over the
court—for example, to its budget, personnel, and flow of cases. Without
change at this deeper level, any change at the superficial level is bound
to be just that and is unlikely to achieve its substantive objectives or
to endure.
However, enduring change is possible when reformers grasp the
challenges before them and draw upon the insights of organizational
culture theory for guidance. That literature suggests that reform in
mature organizations like courts is possible when it is championed by
effective leaders who are skilled not only in articulating a new vision
and direction for the organization, but also in promoting it with the
internal and external actors whose behavior and beliefs must be modified
for the reform to succeed. The leaders must involve their subordinates in
245. Municipal Court, CITY OF NEWARK, https://www.newarknj.gov/departments/
municipalcourt (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
246. See Professor Victoria Pratt Launches a Ted Talk to Advocate for Criminal Justice
Reform, RUTGERS LAW (Nov. 28, 2017), https://law.rutgers.edu/news/professor-victoria-prattlaunches-ted-talk-advocate-criminal-justice-reform.
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the reform process, educate the courthouse community and those
touching upon it, and focus on granular, problem-centered solutions that
are tailored to the local context. They must be savvy in leveraging
community resources and partnerships and in accessing various sources
of funds. And they must manage to hang on long enough to see their
plans through to the point where they can be evaluated and—if they
show promise—become embedded in the culture of the court.
These are not easy tasks in our nation’s misdemeanor courts. While
all criminal courts are challenging environments in which to pursue
reform, some challenges are not present to the same degree in felony
courts. Misdemeanor court judges often are less experienced and moreresource constrained than their felony court counterparts. They also are
most likely to feel pressure to protect the economic interests of their
communities, which have come to expect revenue from fines and fees
collected by their municipal courts, not innovation that moves in the
other direction.247 Judges who wish to advance to a higher level in
the judiciary thus have ample incentive to avoid taking on these
formidable burdens.
And yet there also are reasons to be optimistic about the possibility
of meaningful reform in misdemeanor courts. There is a growing
bipartisan consensus that we cannot afford the social and economic costs
of incarcerating low-level, non-violent offenders to the extent that we
have in the past.248 The tragic events in Ferguson, Missouri, and the
ensuing Department of Justice report have exposed the disturbing truth
about municipalities’ reliance on their courts to support government
services and its corrosive effects.249 Over time, communities will have to
accept that they cannot rely on their courts to supplement their
budgets.250 Advances in technology and the tools available to courts also

247. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., SHARON DOLOVICH & ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, Introduction: Mapping the New
Criminal Justice Thinking, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 1 (Dolovich and Natapoff,
eds. 2017) (“Liberals and conservatives alike condemn the enormous economic costs and
questionable public safety benefits of the current system.”); Justin George, Can Bipartisan
Criminal-Justice Reform Survive in the Trump Era?, NEW YORKER, June 6, 2017 (describing
“unlikely alliance” to “end America’s status as the world’s most prolific jailer” between “liberals
who find the criminal-justice system racist, inequitable, and inhumane” and conservatives “who find
it wasteful, harmful to families, and heavy-handed”).
249. See supra note 131.
250. See, e.g., Letter from Maureen O’Connor, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio to
Ohio State Auditor, Dave Jost (July 12, 2017) (expressing concern about the tone of the audit report,
which reflected “underlying assumption that court fines and fees are merely opportunities for
revenue enhancement” and explaining that “[f]ines and fees are about bad behavior modification;
they are not about improving city, county or state finances”).
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make possible new ways of operating that are more consumer-friendly
and less onerous than the ways of the past.
Taken altogether, these developments have created conditions ripe
for a major re-think of the purposes of misdemeanor courts and the
methods available to accomplish their aims. The recent academic,
judicial, and public attention to misdemeanor offenses and their
consequences has also created venues for judges to share ideas and
experiences, making it more likely that judges even in isolated areas will
be exposed to new models. The increased focus on misdemeanors also
provides an important source of professional recognition for innovative
judges, some of whom may have foreclosed further advancement within
the judiciary because of their reform efforts. Some may not seek such
advancement, having found their calling in serving on the “front porch”
of the criminal justice system. But the increased opportunities to
recognize these judges is all for the better—for it may fortify those
already on the front porch to stay and redouble their efforts and
encourage still others to join them.
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